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The effect of remittances prior to an election

Author

Listed:
  • Jean-Louis COMBES

    (Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sur le Développement International(CERDI))

  • Mathilde MAUREL
  • Christian EBEKE
Abstract
This paper focuses on the relationships between remittances, elections, and government consumption as a percentage of GDP. We combine data from the National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset compiled and discussed in Hyde and Marinov (2012) and the World Development Indicators dataset. We focus on 70 young democracies in the developing world. The period under investigation is 1990-2010. The main objective of the paper is to assess whether remittances have an influence on the political manipulation, which may occur prior to an election, through in increase in the government consumption-to-GDP-ratio. It appears that remittances dampen the political business cycle (PBC). Furthermore, the PBC is reduced up to the point where it is fully cancelled out at a remittance threshold of 10.7 percent of GDP. Those findings are robust to different econometric strategies and robustness checks.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Louis COMBES & Mathilde MAUREL & Christian EBEKE, 2013. "The effect of remittances prior to an election," Working Papers 201307, CERDI.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdi:wpaper:1430
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    Cited by:

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    2. Thierry Baudassé & Rémi Bazillier & Ismaël Issifou, 2018. "Migration And Institutions: Exit And Voice (From Abroad)?," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(3), pages 727-766, July.
    3. Issifou, Ismael, 2017. "Can migration reduce civil conflicts as an antidote to rent-seeking?," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 333-353.
    4. Konte, Maty & Ndubuisi, Gideon, 2019. "Remittances and Bribery in Africa," MERIT Working Papers 2019-043, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
    5. Antoine Cazals & Pierre Mandon, 2015. "Political Budget Cycles: Manipulation of Leaders or Bias from Research? A Meta-Regression Analysis," Working Papers halshs-01238883, HAL.
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    7. Antoine Cazals & Pierre Mandon, 2016. "Political Budget Cycles: Manipulation from Leaders or Manipulation from Researchers? Evidence from a Meta-Regression Analysis," Working Papers halshs-01320586, HAL.
    8. Boly, Mohamed & Combes, Jean-Louis & Combes Motel, Pascale, 2023. "Does environment pay for politicians?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
    9. Antoine Cazals & Pierre Mandon, 2015. "Political Budget Cycles: Manipulation of Leaders or Bias from Research? A Meta-Regression Analysis," CERDI Working papers halshs-01238883, HAL.
    10. Stéphane Goutte & David Guerreiro & Bilel Sanhaji & Sophie Saglio & Julien Chevallier, 2019. "International Financial Markets," Post-Print halshs-02183053, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political Business Cycles; Remittances;

    JEL classification:

    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
    • F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
    • F2 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business

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