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The Logic Of Belief Persistency

Author

Listed:
  • Giacomo Bonanno
  • Pierpaolo Battigalli

    (Department of Economics, University of California Davis)

Abstract
The interaction bietween knowledge and belief in a temporal context is analyzed. An axiomatic formulation and semantic characterization of the principle of belief persistency implied by the standard conditionalization rule are provided. This principle says that an individual does not change her mind unless new evidence forces her to do so. It is shown that if beliefs are conscious (or stateindependent) and satisfy negative introspection then the principle of persistency of beliefs is characterized by the following axiom schema: the individual believes that 9 at date t if and orilly if she believes at date t that she will believe that 4 at date t+l.

Suggested Citation

  • Giacomo Bonanno & Pierpaolo Battigalli, 2004. "The Logic Of Belief Persistency," Working Papers 206, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:206
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-1050, July.
    2. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Matthew Ryan, 2001. "Capacity Updating Rules and Rational Belief Change," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 73-87, August.
    2. Giacomo Bonanno, 2004. "A simple modal logic for belief revision," Working Papers 164, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    3. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Bonanno, Giacomo, 1999. "Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic foundations of game theory," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 149-225, June.
    4. Fukuda, Satoshi, 2024. "The existence of universal qualitative belief spaces," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
    5. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Bonanno, Giacomo, 1999. "Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic foundations of game theory," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 149-225, June.
    6. Samet, Dov, 1999. "Bayesianism without learning," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 227-242, June.
    7. Ryan, Matthew J., 2002. "Violations of Belief Persistence in Dempster-Shafer Equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 167-174, April.
    8. Fukuda, Satoshi, 2020. "Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 169-189.
    9. Giacomo Bonanno, 2004. "A simple modal logic for belief revision," Working Papers 45, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    10. Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, "undated". "Intersubjective Consistency Of Knowledge And Belief," Department of Economics 98-03, California Davis - Department of Economics.
    11. Wang, Weijia, 2019. "A Pareto Criterion on Systemic Risk," MPRA Paper 93699, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Weijia Wang & Shaoan Huang, 2021. "Risk sharing and financial stability: a welfare analysis," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 16(1), pages 211-228, January.
    13. Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, "undated". "Intersubjective Consistency Of Knowledge And Belief," Department of Economics 98-03, California Davis - Department of Economics.
    14. Dominiak, Adam & Lee, Min Suk, 2017. "Coherent Dempster–Shafer equilibrium and ambiguous signals," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 42-54.
    15. Giacomo Bonanno, "undated". "The Logic Of Prediction," Department of Economics 98-12, California Davis - Department of Economics.

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