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Reputation and Cooperation in Defence

Author

Listed:
  • Hugh Jones, David

    (University of Warwick)

  • Zultan, Ro'i

    (University College London)

Abstract
Surprisingly high levels of within-group cooperation are observed in conflict situations. Experiments confirm that external threats lead to higher cooperation. The psychological literature suggests proximate explanations in the form of group processes, but does not explain how these processes can evolve and persist. We provide an ultimate explanation, in which cooperation is a rational response to an external threat. We introduce a model in which groups vary in their willingness to help each other against external attackers. Attackers infer cooperativeness of groups from members’ behaviour under attack, and may be deterred by a group that bands together against an initial attack. Then, even self-interested individuals may defend each other when threatened in order to deter future attacks. We argue that a group’s reputation is a public good with a natural weakest-link structure. We extend the model to cooperative and altruistic behaviour in general.

Suggested Citation

  • Hugh Jones, David & Zultan, Ro'i, 2011. "Reputation and Cooperation in Defence," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 53, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cge:wacage:53
    as

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    File URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/centres/cage/manage/publications/53.2011_hugh_jones.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Kris De Jaegher & Britta Hoyer, 2016. "Collective action and the common enemy effect," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(5), pages 644-664, September.
    2. Wang, Tse-Min & Heine, Florian & van Witteloostuijn, Arjen, 2023. "Pro-social risk-taking and intergroup conflict: A volunteer's dilemma experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 363-379.
    3. Jennings, Colin & Sanchez-Pages, Santiago, 2017. "Social capital, conflict and welfare," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 157-167.
    4. Weisel, Ori & Zultan, Ro׳i, 2016. "Social motives in intergroup conflict: Group identity and perceived target of threat," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 122-133.
    5. Krzysztof Krakowski, 2020. "Pulled Together or Torn Asunder? Community Cohesion After Symmetric and Asymmetric Civil War," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 64(7-8), pages 1470-1498, August.
    6. Weisel, Ori & Zultan, Ro’i, 2021. "Perceptions of conflict: Parochial cooperation and outgroup spite revisited," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 57-71.

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