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Why Voluntary Contributions? Google Answers

Author

Listed:
  • Tobias Regner
Abstract
We study the pricing and tipping behaviour of users of the online service `Google Answers'. While they set a price for the answer to their question ex ante, they can additionally give a tip to the researcher ex post. We develop a model that is based on reciprocal theories of social preferences pioneered by Rabin (1993) and extended by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). The predictions of our model are empirically tested with the field data we obtained. The reasons for leaving a tip are analysed. A significant amount of users are motivated by social preferences. We also find strong support for reputation concerns. Moreover, researchers appear to adjust their effort based on the user's previous tipping behaviour. We conclude that an endogenous incomplete contracts design encourages people to contribute voluntarily. This is motivated by reciprocity when people are socially minded, but also generally by strategic behaviour to build up a good reputation. Efficiency is increased when contracts are left open deliberately as high effort is sustained.

Suggested Citation

  • Tobias Regner, 2005. "Why Voluntary Contributions? Google Answers," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 05/115, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
  • Handle: RePEc:bri:cmpowp:05/115
    as

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    File URL: http://www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/workingpapers/wp115.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Charness, Gary & Rabin, Matthew, 2001. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt4qz9k8vg, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    2. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter & Georg Kirchsteiger, 1997. "Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 833-860, July.
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    5. Cragg, John G, 1971. "Some Statistical Models for Limited Dependent Variables with Application to the Demand for Durable Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 39(5), pages 829-844, September.
    6. Dufwenberg, Martin & Kirchsteiger, Georg, 2004. "A theory of sequential reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 268-298, May.
    7. Amemiya, Takeshi, 1984. "Tobit models: A survey," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 3-61.
    8. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2002. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(3), pages 817-869.
    9. Luis Cabral & Ali Hortacsu, 2004. "The Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Theory and Evidence from eBay," NBER Working Papers 10363, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. John A. List, 2004. "Young, Selfish and Male: Field evidence of social preferences," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(492), pages 121-149, January.
    11. Geanakoplos, John & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1989. "Psychological games and sequential rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 60-79, March.
    12. Azar, Ofer H., 2004. "The history of tipping--from sixteenth-century England to United States in the 1910s," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 745-764, December.
    13. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Regner, Tobias, 2014. "Social preferences? Google Answers!," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 188-209.
    2. Benjamin Edelman, 2012. "Earnings And Ratings At Google Answers," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 50(2), pages 309-320, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    social preferences; reciprocity; moral hazard; reputation; internet;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C24 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Truncated and Censored Models; Switching Regression Models; Threshold Regression Models
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software

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