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How effective and legitimate is the European semester? Increasing role of the European parliament

Author

Listed:
  • Benedicta Marzinotto
  • Guntram B. Wolff
  • Mark Hallerberg
Abstract
The European Semester is a new institutional process that provides EU member states with ex-ante guidance on fiscal and structural objectives. The Semester’s goals are ambitious and it is still uncertain how it will fit into the new EU economic governance framework. We find that member states are only slowly internalising the new procedure. Furthermore, the Semester has so far lacked legitimacy due to the minor role assigned to the...

Suggested Citation

  • Benedicta Marzinotto & Guntram B. Wolff & Mark Hallerberg, 2011. "How effective and legitimate is the European semester? Increasing role of the European parliament," Working Papers 612, Bruegel.
  • Handle: RePEc:bre:wpaper:612
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mr. Anthony M Annett, 2006. "Enforcement and the Stability and Growth Pact: How Fiscal Policy Did and Did Not Change Under Europe’s Fiscal Framework," IMF Working Papers 2006/116, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Hallerberg, Mark & Yläoutinen, Sami, 2010. "Political Power, Fiscal Institutions and Budgetary Outcomes in Central and Eastern Europe," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 30(1), pages 45-62, April.
    3. Hallerberg,Mark & Rainer Strauch,Rolf & von Hagen,Jürgen, 2010. "Fiscal Governance in Europe," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521138260, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Cristina Fasone, 2012. "The Struggle of the European Parliament to Participate in the New Economic Governance," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers 45, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
    2. Walpurga Köhler-Töglhofer, 2011. "Macro Coordination under the European Semester," Monetary Policy & the Economy, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue Q4/11, pages 59-73.
    3. Jérôme Creel, 2021. "Establishing a Fiscal Dialogue in Europe," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 63(3), pages 339-355, September.
    4. Zsolt Darvas, 2012. "The euro crisis- ten roots, but fewer solutions," Policy Contributions 755, Bruegel.
    5. Zsolt Darvas & Jean Pisani-Ferry, 2011. "Europe's growth emergency," Policy Contributions 623, Bruegel.
    6. Ben Crum, 2013. "Saving the Euro at the Cost of Democracy?," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(4), pages 614-630, July.
    7. Maatsch, Aleksandra, 2017. "Effectiveness of the European semester: Explaining domestic consent and contestation," MPIfG Discussion Paper 17/6, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    8. Valerie D'Erman & Amy Verdun, 2022. "An Introduction: “Macroeconomic Policy Coordination and Domestic Politics: Policy Coordination in the EU from the European Semester to the Covid‐19 Crisis”," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(1), pages 3-20, January.
    9. Desislava Kalcheva, 2024. "Sustainability Of The Public Finance In Bulgaria €“ Risks And Perspectives," Yearbook of the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Sofia University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Sofia University St Kliment Ohridski - Bulgaria, vol. 23(1), pages 93-120, June.

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