The Creation of Effective Property Rights
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Other versions of this item:
- Herschel I. Grossman, 2001. "The Creation of Effective Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 347-352, May.
- Herschel I. Grossman, 2000. "The Creation of Effective Property Rights," NBER Working Papers 7897, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
References listed on IDEAS
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0471, Econometric Society.
- Muthoo, Abhinay, 2000. "On the foundations of basic property rights, Part I: A model of the state-of-nature with two players," Economics Discussion Papers 9986, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-1288, December.
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Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February.
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"The Determinants and Impact of Property Rights: Land Titles on the Brazilian Frontier,"
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- Grossman, Herschel I., 1995. "Insurrections," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 191-212, Elsevier.
- repec:bla:econom:v:65:y:1998:i:260:p:461-77 is not listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- P14 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Property Rights
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
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