Product Complementarity and Investment Incentives: Does Asset Ownership Matter?
Author
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990.
"Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1988. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Working papers 495, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Hart, Oliver D. & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Scholarly Articles 3448675, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Chiu, Y Stephen, 1998. "Noncooperative Bargaining, Hostages, and Optimal Asset Ownership," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 882-901, September.
- Ken Binmore & Avner Shared & John Sutton, 1989. "An Outside Option Experiment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(4), pages 753-770.
- Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986.
"The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
- Oliver Hart & Sanford Grossman, 1985. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Working papers 372, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 70, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Scholarly Articles 3450060, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- David de Meza & Ben Lockwood, 1998. "Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? Outside Options and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(2), pages 361-386.
- Patrick Bolton & Michael D. Whinston, 1993. "Incomplete Contracts, Vertical Integration, and Supply Assurance," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 60(1), pages 121-148.
- Holmstrom, Bengt R. & Tirole, Jean, 1989. "The theory of the firm," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 61-133, Elsevier.
- John Sutton, 1986. "Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(5), pages 709-724.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Chatterjee Kalyan & Chiu Y. Stephen, 2007.
"When Does Competition Lead to Efficient Investments?,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-39, July.
- Kalyan Chatterjee & Y. Stephen Chiu, 2000. "When Does Competition Lead to Efficient Investments?," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0518, Econometric Society.
- Mumcu, Ayse, 2006. "Production Complementarity and Investment Incentives: Does Asset Ownership Matter?," MPRA Paper 1910, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Robert Gibbons & John Roberts, 2012. "The Handbook of Organizational Economics," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 9889.
- Ilya Segal & Michael D.Whinston, 2012. "Property Rights [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
- Antonio Nicita & Massimiliamo Vatiro, 2008. "Incomplete Contracts, Property Rights and Endogenous Outside Options," Department of Economics University of Siena 545, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014.
"Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 21-24.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered," MPRA Paper 91457, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered," CEPR Discussion Papers 10110, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kvaløy, Ola, 2008. "Do norms matter for firm boundaries?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 969-975, June.
- Thiele, Veikko, 2007. "The Demand for Tailored Goods and the Theory of the Firm," MPRA Paper 2471, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Castaneda, Marco A., 2006. "The hold-up problem in a repeated relationship," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(5), pages 953-970, September.
- Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman, 2014.
"Contracts, Ownership, and Industrial Organization: Past and Future,"
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 30(suppl_1), pages 82-117.
- Patrick Legros & Andrew Newman, 2014. "Contracts, Ownership, and Industrial Organization: Past and Future," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/229731, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Maderner, Nina & Tournas, Yanni, 2002.
"Idiosyncratic investments, outside opportunities and the boundaries of the firm,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(8), pages 1119-1141, October.
- Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Tournas, Yanni & Maderner, Nina, 2000. "Idiosyncratic Investments, Outside Opportunities and the Boundaries of the Firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 2558, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Aghion, Philippe & Dewatripont, Mathias & Legros, Patrick & Zingales, Luigi (ed.), 2016. "The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199826216.
- David de Meza & Mariano Selvaggi, 2004. "Exclusive Contracts Foster Relationship-Specific Investment," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 04/105, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
- Susheng Wang & Tian (Tim) Zhu, 2000. "Bargaining, Revenue Sharing and Control Rights Allocation," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0373, Econometric Society.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Jozsef Sakovics, 2006. "The Hold-up Problem," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 142, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Chong-En Bai & Zhigang Tao & Changqi Wu, 2004.
"Revenue Sharing and Control Rights in Team Production: Theories and Evidence from Joint Ventures,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(2), pages 277-305, Summer.
- Chong-En Bai & Zhigang Tao & Changqi Wu, 2003. "Revenue Sharing and Control Rights in Team Production: Theories and Evidence from Joint Ventures.," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2003-563, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Vasconcelos, Luís, 2014.
"Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 19-33.
- Luis Vasconcelos, 2006. "Contractual signalling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements," Nova SBE Working Paper Series wp495, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics.
- Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2003.
"Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R&D alliances,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 153-173, April.
- Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic R&D Alliances," CEPR Discussion Papers 2698, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Daron Acemoglu & Philippe Aghion & Rachel Griffith & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2010.
"Vertical Integration and Technology: Theory and Evidence,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(5), pages 989-1033, September.
- Daron Acemoglu & Philippe Aghion & Rachel Griffith & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2004. "Vertical integration and technology: theory and evidence," IFS Working Papers W04/34, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Daron Acemoglu & Philippe Aghion & Rachel Griffith & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2004. "Vertical Integration and Technology: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 10997, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Aghion, Philippe & Acemoglu, Daron & Zilibotti, Fabrizio & Griffith, Rachel, 2005. "Vertical Integration and Technology: Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 5258, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Zilibotti, Fabrizio & Griffith, Rachel & Aghion, Philippe & Acemoglu, Daron, 2010. "Vertical Integration and Technology: Theory and Evidence," Scholarly Articles 4554219, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Daron Acemoglu & Philippe Aghion & Rachel Griffith & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2007. "Vertical Integration and Technology: Theory and Evidence," IEW - Working Papers 342, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Eitan Goldman & Gary Gorton, 2000.
"The Visible Hand, the Invisible Hand and Efficiency,"
NBER Working Papers
7587, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Eitan Goldman & Gary Gorton, 2000. "The Visible Hand, The Invisible Hand and Efficiency," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 00-05, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bou:wpaper:2006/05. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Lutfu Gozgucu (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deboutr.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.