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The Best at the Top? Candidate Ranking Strategies Under Closed List Proportional Representation

Author

Listed:
  • Benoit S Y Crutzen

    (Erasmus School of Economics)

  • Hideo Konishi

    (Boston College)

  • Nicolas Sahuguet

    (HEC Montreal)

Abstract
Under closed-list proportional representation, a partyís electoral list determines the order in which legislative seats are allocated to candidates. When candidates differ in their ability, parties face a trade-off between competence and incentives. Ranking candidates in decreasing order of competence ensures that elected politicians are most competent. Yet, party list create incentives for candidates that may push parties not to rank candidates in decreasing competence order. We examine this trade-off in a game-theoretical model in which parties rank their candidate on a list, candidates choose their campaign effort, and the election is a team contest for multiple prizes. We show that the trade-off between competence and incentives depends on candidatesíobjective and the electoral environment. In particular, parties rank candidates in decreasing order of competence if candidates value enough post-electoral high offices or media coverage focuses on candidates at the top of the list.

Suggested Citation

  • Benoit S Y Crutzen & Hideo Konishi & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2021. "The Best at the Top? Candidate Ranking Strategies Under Closed List Proportional Representation," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1032, Boston College Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:boc:bocoec:1032
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    voting; proportional representation; tradeoffs; ranking;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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