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First-Mover Advantage In Round-Robin Tournaments

Author

Listed:
  • Alex Krumer

    (Ariel University,Israel)

  • Reut Megidish

    (Sapir Academic College, Israel.)

  • Aner Sela

    (BGU)

Abstract
We study round-robin tournaments with either three or four symmetric players whose values of winning are common knowledge. With three players there are three rounds, each of which includes one pair-wise game such that each player competes in two rounds only. The player who wins two games wins the tournament. We characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium and show that each player’s expected payoff and probability of winning is maximized when he competes in the first and the last rounds. With four players there are three rounds, each of which includes two sequential pair-wise games where each player plays against a different opponent in every round. We again characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium and show that a player who plays in the first game of each of the first two rounds has a first-mover advantage as reflected by a significantly higher winning probability as well as by a significantly higher expected payoff than his opponents.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Alex Krumer & Reut Megidish & Aner Sela, 2015. "First-Mover Advantage In Round-Robin Tournaments," Working Papers 1509, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1509
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    File URL: http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/1509.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    All-pay contests; round-robin tournaments; first-mover advantage;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

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