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Bundling in Telecommunications

Author

Listed:
  • Begoña Garcia Mariñoso
  • Xavier Martínez-Giralt
  • Pau Olivella
Abstract
The paper offers an overview of the literature on bundling in the telecommunications sector and its application in the Spanish market. We argue that the use of bundling in the provision of services is associated to technological reasons. Therefore, there appears no need to regulate bundling activities. However, this is not to say that other related telecom markets should not be scrutinized and regulated, or that the regulator should not pay attention to other bundling-related anticompetitive practices.

Suggested Citation

  • Begoña Garcia Mariñoso & Xavier Martínez-Giralt & Pau Olivella, 2008. "Bundling in Telecommunications," Working Papers 356, Barcelona School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:356
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Oseni, Musiliu O. & Pollitt, Michael G., 2017. "The prospects for smart energy prices: Observations from 50 years of residential pricing for fixed line telecoms and electricity," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 150-160.
    2. García-Mariñoso, Begoña & Suárez, David, 2019. "Switching mobile operators: Evidence about consumers’ behavior from a longitudinal survey," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(5), pages 426-433.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bundling; Telecommunications;

    JEL classification:

    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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