[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/bbe/wpaper/0302.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Assessing the Structural Change of Strategic Mobility Determinants Under Hypercompetitive Environments

Author

Listed:
  • José Ángel Zúñiga Vicente
  • José David Vicente Lorente

    (Departamento de Administración y Economía de la Empresa Universidad de Salamanca.)

Abstract
The primary purpose of this exploratory empirical study is to examine the structural stability of a limited number of alternative explanatory factors of strategic change. On the basis of theoretical arguments and prior empirical evidence from two traditional perspectives, we propose an original empirical framework to analyse whether these potentia l explanatory factors have remained stable overtime in a highly turbulent environment. This original question is explored in a particular setting: the population of Spanish private banks. The firms of this industry have experienced a high level of strategic mobility as a consequence of fundament al changes undergone in their environmental conditions over the last two decades (mainly changes related to the new banking and financial regulation process). Our results consistently support that the effect of most explanatory factors of strategic mobility considered did not remain stable over the whole period of analysis. From this point of view, the study sheds new light on major debates and dilemmas in the field of strategy regarding why firms change their competitive patterns over time and, hence, to what extent the ‘context- dependency’ of alternative views of strategic change as their relative validation can vary over time for a given population. Methodologically, this research makes two major contributions to the study of potential determinants of strategic change. First, the definition and measurement of strategic change employing a new grouping method, the Model-based Cluster Method or MCLUST. Second, in order to asses the possible effect of determinants of strategic mobility we have controlled the non-observableheterogeneity using logistic re gression models for panel data.

Suggested Citation

  • José Ángel Zúñiga Vicente & José David Vicente Lorente, 2003. "Assessing the Structural Change of Strategic Mobility Determinants Under Hypercompetitive Environments," Working Papers 0302, Departament Empresa, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, revised Feb 2003.
    • Handle: RePEc:bbe:wpaper:0302
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.uab.cat/servlet/BlobServer?blobtable=Document&blobcol=urldocument&blobheader=application/pdf&blobkey=id&blobwhere=1345650536869&blobnocache=true
    File Function: Revised version, 2003
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
    2. repec:bla:jfinan:v:43:y:1988:i:3:p:593-616 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Levine, David I., 1991. "Worth Waiting For? Delayed Compensation, Training and Turnover in the United States and Japan," Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series qt97m9v25n, Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley.
    4. Asch, Beth J & Warner, John T, 2001. "A Theory of Compensation and Personnel Policy in Hierarchical Organizations with Application to the United States Military," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(3), pages 523-562, July.
    5. Jacob A. Mincer, 1974. "Introduction to "Schooling, Experience, and Earnings"," NBER Chapters, in: Schooling, Experience, and Earnings, pages 1-4, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Katharine G. Abraham & James L. Medoff, 1985. "Length of Service and Promotions in Union and Nonunion Work Groups," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 38(3), pages 408-420, April.
    7. James A. Fairburn & James M. Malcomson, 2001. "Performance, Promotion, and the Peter Principle," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 68(1), pages 45-66.
    8. Pedro Ortin-Angel & Vicente Salas-Fumas, 2002. "Compensation and Span of Control in Hierarchical Organizations," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(4), pages 848-876, October.
    9. Paul Osterman, 2000. "Work Reorganization in an Era of Restructuring: Trends in Diffusion and Effects on Employee Welfare," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 53(2), pages 179-196, January.
    10. Michael Waldman, 1984. "Job Assignments, Signalling, and Efficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 255-267, Summer.
    11. Broder, Ivy E, 1993. "Professional Achievements and Gender Differences among Academic Economists," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 31(1), pages 116-127, January.
    12. Paul Osterman, 1994. "How Common is Workplace Transformation and Who Adopts it?," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 47(2), pages 173-188, January.
    13. Levine, David I, 1993. "Worth Waiting For? Delayed Compensation, Training, and Turnover in the United States and Japan," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 11(4), pages 724-752, October.
    14. Chan, William, 1996. "External Recruitment versus Internal Promotion," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(4), pages 555-570, October.
    15. Bernhardt, Dan & Scoones, David, 1993. "Promotion, Turnover, and Preemptive Wage Offers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 771-791, September.
    16. Drago, Robert & Garvey, Gerald T, 1998. "Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 1-25, January.
    17. Jacob A. Mincer, 1974. "Schooling, Experience, and Earnings," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number minc74-1.
    18. Felli, Leonardo & Harris, Christopher, 1996. "Learning, Wage Dynamics, and Firm-Specific Human Capital," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(4), pages 838-868, August.
    19. Canice Prendergast, 1993. "The Role of Promotion in Inducing Specific Human Capital Acquisition," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 108(2), pages 523-534.
    20. Milton Harris & Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "A Theory of Wage Dynamics," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 49(3), pages 315-333.
    21. Lazear, Edward P, 1989. "Pay Equality and Industrial Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 561-580, June.
    22. Lorne Carmichael, 1983. "Firm-Specific Human Capital and Promotion Ladders," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(1), pages 251-258, Spring.
    23. Alberto Bayo–Moriones & Emilio Huerta–Arribas, 2002. "The Adoption of Production Incentives in Spain," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 40(4), pages 709-724, December.
    24. Treble, John & van Gameren, Edwin & Bridges, Sarah & Barmby, Tim, 2001. "The internal economics of the firm: further evidence from personnel data," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(5), pages 531-552, December.
    25. Milbourn, Todd T & Shockley, Richard L & Thakor, Anjan V, 2001. "Managerial Career Concerns and Investments in Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(2), pages 334-351, Summer.
    26. Jacob A. Mincer, 1974. "Age and Experience Profiles of Earnings," NBER Chapters, in: Schooling, Experience, and Earnings, pages 64-82, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    27. Garen, John E, 1994. "Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(6), pages 1175-1199, December.
    28. Baker, G.P. & Jensen, M.C. & Murphy, K.J., 1988. "Compensation And Incentives: Practice Vs. Theory," Papers 88-05, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
    29. Topel, Robert H, 1991. "Specific Capital, Mobility, and Wages: Wages Rise with Job Seniority," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(1), pages 145-176, February.
    30. George Baker & Michael Gibbs & Bengt Holmstrom, 1994. "The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(4), pages 881-919.
    31. Williamson, Oliver E, 1983. "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 519-540, September.
    32. McCue, Kristin, 1996. "Promotions and Wage Growth," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(2), pages 175-209, April.
    33. Gibbons, Robert & Waldman, Michael, 1999. "Careers in organizations: Theory and evidence," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 36, pages 2373-2437, Elsevier.
    34. Stephen J. Spurr & Glenn T. Sueyoshi, 1994. "Turnover and Promotion of Lawyers: An Inquiry into Gender Differences," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 29(3), pages 813-842.
    35. Michael R. Pergamit & Jonathan R. Veum, 1999. "What is a Promotion?," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 52(4), pages 581-601, July.
    36. Jacob A. Mincer, 1974. "Schooling and Earnings," NBER Chapters, in: Schooling, Experience, and Earnings, pages 41-63, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    37. Ricart i Costa, Joan E, 1988. "Managerial Task Assignment and Promotions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 449-466, March.
    38. Gibbs, Michael, 1995. "Incentive compensation in a corporate hierarchy," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2-3), pages 247-277, April.
    39. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1979. "Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 231-259, April.
    40. Michael Spence, 1976. "Competition in Salaries, Credentials, and Signaling Prerequisites for Jobs," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(1), pages 51-74.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Alberto Bayo-Moriones & Pedro Ortín-Ángel, 2003. "Internal Promotion Versus External Recruitment: Evidence in Industrial Plants," Working Papers 0303, Departament Empresa, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, revised Mar 2003.
    2. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2373-2437 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Waldman, Michael, 2013. "Classic promotion tournaments versus market-based tournaments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 198-210.
    4. Xin Jin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Not Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 0314, University of South Florida, Department of Economics.
    5. Jin, Xin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Note Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," MPRA Paper 58484, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Michael Waldman, 2012. "Theory and Evidence in Internal LaborMarkets [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
    7. Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 2006. "Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics inside Firms," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 59-108, January.
    8. Dohmen, Thomas J., 2004. "Performance, seniority, and wages: formal salary systems and individual earnings profiles," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(6), pages 741-763, December.
    9. Suman Ghosh & Michael Waldman, 2010. "Standard promotion practices versus up‐or‐out contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(2), pages 301-325, June.
    10. Melero Martín, Eduardo, 2004. "Evidence on Training and Career Paths: Human Capital, Information and Incentives," IZA Discussion Papers 1377, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    11. DeVaro, Jed, 2011. "Using "opposing responses" and relative performance to distinguish empirically among alternative models of promotions," MPRA Paper 35175, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Alberto Bayo-Moriones & Jose E. Galdon-Sanchez & Maia Güell, 2010. "Is seniority-based pay used as a motivational device? Evidence from plant-level data," Research in Labor Economics, in: Jobs, Training, and Worker Well-being, pages 155-187, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    13. Patrick Kampkoetter, 2012. "Determinants of Compensation in the Financial Services Industry," Cologne Graduate School Working Paper Series 03-12, Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences.
    14. Pedro Ortín‐Ángel & Vicente Salas‐fumás, 1998. "Agency‐Theory and Internal‐Labor‐Market Explanations of Bonus Payments: Empirical Evidence from Spanish Firms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(4), pages 573-613, December.
    15. C. Sofia Machado & Miguel Portela, 2011. "Age and opportunities for promotion," NIPE Working Papers 03/2011, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
    16. Ján Zábojník, 2012. "Promotion tournaments in market equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(1), pages 213-240, September.
    17. Alberto Bayo-Moriones & Pedro Ortín-à ngel, 2006. "Internal Promotion versus External Recruitment in Industrial Plants in Spain," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 59(3), pages 451-470, April.
    18. Alexander K. Koch & Julia Nafziger, 2012. "Job Assignments under Moral Hazard: The Peter Principle Revisited," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(4), pages 1029-1059, December.
    19. Edward P. Lazear, 1995. "Personnel Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121883, April.
    20. Ferreira, Priscila, 2009. "The determinants of promotions and firm separations," ISER Working Paper Series 2009-11, Institute for Social and Economic Research.
    21. Jason G. Cummins & Ingmar Nyman, 2013. "Yes Men in Tournaments," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(4), pages 621-659, December.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bbe:wpaper:0302. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Departament Empresa (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://158.109.224.4/webeco/plaes/RePEc/bbe/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.