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House-Swapping with Objective Indifferences

Author

Listed:
  • Will Sandholtz
  • Andrew Tai
Abstract
We study the classic house-swapping problem of Shapley and Scarf (1974) in a setting where agents may have "objective" indifferences, i.e., indifferences that are shared by all agents. In other words, if any one agent is indifferent between two houses, then all agents are indifferent between those two houses. The most direct interpretation is the presence of multiple copies of the same object. Our setting is a special case of the house-swapping problem with general indifferences. We derive a simple, easily interpretable algorithm that produces the unique strict core allocation of the house-swapping market, if it exists. Our algorithm runs in square polynomial time, a substantial improvement over the cubed time methods for the more general problem.

Suggested Citation

  • Will Sandholtz & Andrew Tai, 2023. "House-Swapping with Objective Indifferences," Papers 2306.09529, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2306.09529
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Thomas Quint & Jun Wako, 2004. "On Houseswapping, the Strict Core, Segmentation, and Linear Programming," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm373, Yale School of Management.
    2. Jaramillo, Paula & Manjunath, Vikram, 2012. "The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1913-1946.
    3. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Molis, Elena, 2011. "Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: The Top Trading Absorbing Sets mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 1-16, September.
    4. Thomas Quint & Jun Wako, 2004. "On Houseswapping, the Strict Core, Segmentation, and Linear Programming," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 29(4), pages 861-877, November.
    5. Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
    6. Roth, Alvin E. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1977. "Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 131-137, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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