On extensions of partial priorities in school choice
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Cited by:
- Emilio Guaman & Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez, 2023. "Coalitional Stability and Incentives in Housing Markets with Incomplete Preferences," Working Papers wp547, University of Chile, Department of Economics.
- Minoru Kitahara & Yasunori Okumura, 2023. "School Choice with Multiple Priorities," Papers 2308.04780, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
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NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DCM-2023-06-12 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-DES-2023-06-12 (Economic Design)
- NEP-URE-2023-06-12 (Urban and Real Estate Economics)
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