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Time-constrained Dynamic Mechanisms for College Admissions

Author

Listed:
  • Li Chen
  • Juan S. Pereyra
  • Min Zhu
Abstract
Recent literature shows that dynamic matching mechanisms may outperform the standard mechanisms to deliver desirable results. We highlight an under-explored design dimension, the time constraints that students face under such a dynamic mechanism. First, we theoretically explore the effect of time constraints and show that the outcome can be worse than the outcome produced by the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Second, we present evidence from the Inner Mongolian university admissions that time constraints can prevent dynamic mechanisms from achieving stable outcomes, creating losers and winners among students.

Suggested Citation

  • Li Chen & Juan S. Pereyra & Min Zhu, 2022. "Time-constrained Dynamic Mechanisms for College Admissions," Papers 2207.12179, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2207.12179
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    References listed on IDEAS

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