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A Lipsetian Theory of Institutional Change

Author

Listed:
  • Raouf Boucekkine

    (Aix-Marseille University (Aix-Marseille School of Economics), CNRS and EHESS)

  • Paolo G. Piacquadio

    (Department of Economics, University of Oslo)

  • Fabien Prieur

    (INRA-LAMETA and University of Montpellier)

Abstract
The paper addresses the role of education policies for institutional change. We focus on two contrasting effects of education and human capital accumulation. On the one side, education prompts economic growth and increases the wealth managed by an autocratic elite. On the other side, education increases the awareness of citizens (capturing their reluctance to accept a dictatorship and their labor-market aspirations) and requires the elite to devote more resources to income redistribution. Along the lines of this trade-off, our theory provides a Lipsetian explanation of the positive relationship between education and institutional change, the positive relationship between development and institutional change, and the negative relationship between inequality and institutional change. Furthermore, we obtain new insights on the natural resources curse hypothesis and on the design of development aid programs.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Raouf Boucekkine & Paolo G. Piacquadio & Fabien Prieur, 2015. "A Lipsetian Theory of Institutional Change," AMSE Working Papers 1512, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
    • Handle: RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1512
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    democratization; human capital; Lipset’s theory; natural resource curse;
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