[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/uwarer/269650.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Sovereign debt restructuring: the Judge, the vultures and creditor rights

Author

Listed:
  • Miller, Marcus
  • Thomas, Dania
Abstract
What role did the US courts play in the Argentine debt swap of 2005? What implications does this have for the future of creditor rights in sovereign bond markets? The judge in the Argentine case has, it appears, deftly exploited creditor heterogeneity – between holdouts seeking capital gains and institutional investors wanting a settlement – to promote a swap with a supermajority of creditors. Our analysis of Argentine debt litigation reveals a ‘judge-mediated’ sovereign debt restructuring, which resolves the key issues of Transition and Aggregation - two of the tasks envisaged for the IMF’s still-born Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism. For the future, we discuss how judge-mediated sovereign debt restructuring (together with creditor committees) could complement the alternative promoted by the US Treasury, namely collective action clauses in sovereign bond contracts.

Suggested Citation

  • Miller, Marcus & Thomas, Dania, 2006. "Sovereign debt restructuring: the Judge, the vultures and creditor rights," Economic Research Papers 269650, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:uwarer:269650
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.269650
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269650/files/twerp_757.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269650/files/twerp_757.pdf?subformat=pdfa
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.269650?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fernando Broner & Alberto Martin & Jaume Ventura, 2010. "Sovereign Risk and Secondary Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1523-1555, September.
    2. Rui Pedro Esteves, 2007. "Quis custodiet quem? Sovereign Debt and Bondholders` Protection Before 1914," Economics Series Working Papers 323, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    3. Alexander Guembel & Oren Sussman, 2009. "Sovereign Debt without Default Penalties," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(4), pages 1297-1320.
    4. Antonio Merlo & Charles Wilson, 1997. "Efficient delays in a stochastic model of bargaining," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(1), pages 39-55.
    5. Gai, Prasanna & Hayes, Simon & Shin, Hyun Song, 2004. "Crisis costs and debtor discipline: the efficacy of public policy in sovereign debt crises," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 245-262, March.
    6. Kohlscheen, E. & O'Connell, S. A., 2007. "Trade Credit, International Reserves and Sovereign Debt," Economic Research Papers 269782, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    7. Kenneth Rogoff, 1999. "International Institutions for Reducing Global Financial Instability," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 21-42, Fall.
    8. Jérôme Sgard, 2004. "Are There Such Things as International Property Rights?," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 387-401, March.
    9. Brian D. Wright & Kenneth M. Kletzer, 2000. "Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 621-639, June.
    10. Arturo C. Porzecanski, 2005. "From Rogue Creditors to Rogue Debtors: Implications of Argentina's Default," International Finance 0510010, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 155-178, February.
    12. Sayantan Ghosal & Marcus Miller, 2003. "Co-ordination Failure, Moral Hazard and Sovereign Bankruptcy Procedures," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(487), pages 276-304, April.
    13. Amrita Dhillon & Javier García‐Fronti & Sayantan Ghosal & Marcus Miller, 2006. "Debt Restructuring and Economic Recovery: Analysing the Argentine Swap," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(4), pages 377-398, April.
    14. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309.
    15. ,, 2004. "Problems And Solutions," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(2), pages 427-429, April.
    16. Michael P. Dooley, 2000. "Can Output Losses Following International Financial Crises be Avoided?," NBER Working Papers 7531, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Irwin, Gregor & Penalver, Adrian & Salmon, Chris & Taylor, Ashley, 2008. "Dealing with country diversity: challenges for the IMF credit union model," Bank of England working papers 349, Bank of England.
    18. ,, 2004. "Problems And Solutions," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 223-229, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Schumacher, Julian & Trebesch, Christoph & Enderlein, Henrik, 2021. "Sovereign defaults in court," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
    2. Cadigan, John & Schmitt, Pamela & Shupp, Robert & Swope, Kurtis, 2011. "The holdout problem and urban sprawl: Experimental evidence," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 72-81, January.
    3. Häseler, Sönke, 2012. "Individual versus Collective Enforcement Rights in Sovereign Bonds," MPRA Paper 40908, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Martin Guzman, 0. "An Analysis of Argentina’s 2001 Default Resolution," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 0, pages 1-38.
    5. Sönke Häseler, 2009. "Collective Action Clauses In International Sovereign Bond Contracts – Whence The Opposition?," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(5), pages 882-923, December.
    6. Kartik Anand & Prasanna Gai, 2019. "Pre-emptive sovereign debt restructuring and holdout litigation," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 364-381.
    7. Grossman, Zachary & Pincus, Jonathan & Shapiro, Perry & Yengin, Duygu, 2019. "Second-best mechanisms for land assembly and hold-out problems," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 1-16.
    8. John Cadigan & Pamela Schmitt & Robert Shupp & Kurtis Swope, 2009. "An Experimental Study of the Holdout Problem in a Multilateral Bargaining Game," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 76(2), pages 444-457, October.
    9. Marcus Miller & Dania Thomas, 2013. "Eurozone sovereign debt restructuring: keeping the vultures at bay," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 29(4), pages 745-763, WINTER.
    10. Eggert Wolfgang & Stephan Maximilian & von Ungern-Sternberg Handirk, 2016. "Eine Analyse polit-ökonomischer Probleme bei Staatsumschuldungen," Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 65(2), pages 157-176, August.
    11. Trebesch, Christoph, 2008. "Delays in Sovereign Debt Restructurings. Should we really blame the creditors?," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Zurich 2008 44, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
    12. Ghosal, Sayantan & Miller, Marcus & Thampanishvong, Kannika, 2010. "Delay and Haircuts in Sovereign Debt: Recovery and Sustainability," SIRE Discussion Papers 2010-17, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    13. Julian Schumacher & Christoph Trebesch & Henrik Enderlein, 2015. "What Explains Sovereign Debt Litigation?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(3).
    14. Häseler, Sönke, 2008. "Individual Enforcement Rights in International Sovereign Bonds," MPRA Paper 11518, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Wolfgang Eggert & Maximilian Stephan & Janine Temme & Handirk von Ungern-Sternberg, 2015. "Diversification, Risk Aversion and Expectation in a Holdout Scenario," CESifo Working Paper Series 5527, CESifo.
    16. Martin Guzman, 2020. "An Analysis of Argentina’s 2001 Default Resolution," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 62(4), pages 701-738, December.
    17. Engelen, Christian & Graf Lambsdorff, Johann, 2007. "Fairness in sovereign debt restructuring," Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe V-50-07, University of Passau, Faculty of Business and Economics.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Patrick Bolton & Olivier Jeanne, 2009. "Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Role of Seniority -super-1," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(3), pages 879-902.
    2. Ghosal, Sayantan & Thampanishvong, Kannika, 2013. "Does strengthening Collective Action Clauses (CACs) help?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 68-78.
    3. Christoph Trebesch, 2009. "The Cost of Aggressive Sovereign Debt Policies: How Much is theprivate Sector Affected?," IMF Working Papers 2009/029, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Rohan Pitchford & Mark L. J. Wright, 2013. "On the contribution of game theory to the study of sovereign debt and default," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 29(4), pages 649-667, WINTER.
    5. Schumacher, Julian & Trebesch, Christoph & Enderlein, Henrik, 2021. "Sovereign defaults in court," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
    6. Michael Tomz & Mark L.J. Wright, 2013. "Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and Default," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 5(1), pages 247-272, May.
    7. Nicola Gennaioli & Alberto Martin & Stefano Rossi, 2014. "Sovereign Default, Domestic Banks, and Financial Institutions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(2), pages 819-866, April.
    8. Acharya, Viral V. & Rajan, Raghuram G. & Shim, Jack B., 2024. "Sovereign debt and economic growth when government is myopic and self-interested," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
    9. Jaume Ventura & Fernando Broner, 2008. "Rethinking the effects of financial liberalization," 2008 Meeting Papers 747, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    10. Fernando Broner & Jaume Ventura, 2016. "Rethinking the Effects of Financial Globalization," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 131(3), pages 1497-1542.
    11. Acharya, Viral V. & Rajan, Raghuram G. & Shim, Jack B., 2024. "Reprint of “Sovereign debt and economic growth when government is myopic and self-interested”," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 149(C).
    12. Chamon, Marcos & Schumacher, Julian & Trebesch, Christoph, 2018. "Foreign-Law Bonds: Can They Reduce Sovereign Borrowing Costs?," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 114, pages 164-179.
    13. Francesca Caselli & Matilde Faralli & Paolo Manasse & Ugo Panizza, 2021. "On the Benefits of Repaying," IMF Working Papers 2021/233, International Monetary Fund.
    14. Filippo Brutti & Philip Sauré, 2016. "Repatriation of Debt in the Euro Crisis," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 145-174.
    15. Viral V. Acharya & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2013. "Sovereign Debt, Government Myopia, and the Financial Sector," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 26(6), pages 1526-1560.
    16. Rose, Andrew K., 2005. "One reason countries pay their debts: renegotiation and international trade," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 189-206, June.
    17. Guido Sandleris, 2016. "The Costs of Sovereign Default: Theory and Empirical Evidence," Economía Journal, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association - LACEA, vol. 0(Spring 20), pages 1-27, April.
    18. Amrita Dhillon & Andrew Pickering & Tomas Sjöström, 2019. "Sovereign debt: election concerns and the democratic disadvantage," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 320-343.
    19. Andrew G Haldane & Gregor Irwin & Victoria Saporta, 2004. "Bail out or work out? theoretical considerations," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(494), pages 130-148, March.
    20. Goderis, Benedikt & Wagner, Wolf, 2009. "Credit Derivatives and Sovereign Debt Crises," MPRA Paper 17314, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial Economics; International Development;

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • K49 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Other

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:uwarer:269650. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.