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Dynamic Supply From A Common Property Resource: Water Diversions From The Great Lakes

Author

Listed:
  • Becker, Nir
  • Easter, K. William
Abstract
No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Becker, Nir & Easter, K. William, 1990. "Dynamic Supply From A Common Property Resource: Water Diversions From The Great Lakes," Staff Papers 13683, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:umaesp:13683
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.13683
    as

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    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/13683/files/p90-32.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Becker, Nir & Easter, K. William, 1989. "Diversions From The Great Lakes: Opportunities And Dangers," Staff Papers 14168, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
    2. Keith C. Knapp, 1983. "Steady-State Solutions to Dynamic Optimization Models with Inequality Constraints," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 59(3), pages 300-304.
    3. Runge, Carlisle Ford, 1986. "Common property and collective action in economic development," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 14(5), pages 623-635, May.
    4. Easter, K. William & Frerichs, Stephen, 1988. "Managing The Great Lakes Commons: An Evaluation Of Recent Institutional Changes," Economic Reports 13019, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
    5. Reinganum, Jennifer F & Stokey, Nancy L, 1985. "Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(1), pages 161-173, February.
    6. David Levhari & Leonard J. Mirman, 1980. "The Great Fish War: An Example Using a Dynamic Cournot-Nash Solution," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 322-334, Spring.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Keywords

    Resource /Energy Economics and Policy;

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