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The Common Property Problem and Pastoral Economic Behaviour

Author

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  • Livingstone, Ian
Abstract
Widely accepted views among technical personnel and particularly developmnent programme administrators are that the explanation of widespread range of degradation in pastoral areas lies in the problem of common property (whereby private benefits from putting additional livestock on the range exceed social benefits), and that, more generally, pastoralists have an "irrational" propensity to accumulate stock. The policy conclusions drawn int his paper relate to the appropriate level of water investment and veterinary programmes. The paper exposes major deficiencies of logic in the standard arguments and explores the rationale of pastoral economic behaviour in a mroe systematic way.

Suggested Citation

  • Livingstone, Ian, 1987. "The Common Property Problem and Pastoral Economic Behaviour," 1987 Occasional Paper Series No. 4 197655, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:iaaeo4:197655
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.197655
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ian Livingstone, 1977. "Economic Irrationality Among Pastoral Peoples: Myth or Reality?," Development and Change, International Institute of Social Studies, vol. 8(2), pages 209-230, April.
    2. Carlisle Ford Runge, 1981. "Common Property Externalities: Isolation, Assurance, and Resource Depletion in a Traditional Grazing Context," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 63(4), pages 595-606.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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