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Linking of Repeated Games. When Does It Lead to More Cooperation and Pareto Improvements?

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  • von Mouche, Pierre
  • Folmer, Henk
Abstract
Linking of repeated games and exchange of concessions in fields of relative strength may lead to more cooperation and to Pareto improvements relative to the situation where each game is played separately. In this paper we formalize these statements, provide some general results concerning the conditions for more cooperation and Pareto improvements to materialize or not and analyze the relation between both. Special attention is paid to the role of asymmetries.

Suggested Citation

  • von Mouche, Pierre & Folmer, Henk, 2007. "Linking of Repeated Games. When Does It Lead to More Cooperation and Pareto Improvements?," Economic Theory and Applications Working Papers 9557, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:feemet:9557
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.9557
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jean-Pierre Benoît & Vijay Krishna, 1996. "The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games - A Synthesis," Discussion Papers 96-03, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    2. Michael Finus & Alejandro Caparrós (ed.), 2015. "Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 15345.
    3. Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 1999. "On Interdependent Supergames: Multimarket Contact, Concavity, and Collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 127-139, November.
    4. Nick Hanley & Henk Folmer (ed.), 1998. "Game Theory and the Environment," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1083.
    5. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1990. "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
    6. Henk Folmer & Pierre Mouche & Shannon Ragland, 1993. "Interconnected games and international environmental problems," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 3(4), pages 313-335, August.
    7. Just, Richard E. & Netanyahu, Sinaia, 2000. "The importance of structure in linking games," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 24(1), pages 87-100, December.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Research Methods/ Statistical Methods;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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