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Farmer groups as a device to ensure the provision of green services in the Netherlands: a political economy perspective

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  • Jongeneel, Roel
  • Polman, Nico
Abstract
The latest reform of the CAP, CAP towards 2020, opens up the possibility to arrange agri-environmental service provision via contracting groups of farmers, rather than contracting individual farmers. The Dutch government decided to fully switch to a farmer group service provision system in 2016. The paper analyses the new organisational framework that now is derived and links it to the Dutch tradition of environmental cooperatives. Issues of collective action, transaction costs, information problems, effectiveness, accountability, and procurement efficiency are analysed in a qualitative way. It is concluded that the Dutch model is promising, although not without risks. Its implementation path seems properly chosen. However, in order to fully reap the benefits possible under the new system one need to reduce restrictions and increase incentives.

Suggested Citation

  • Jongeneel, Roel & Polman, Nico, 2014. "Farmer groups as a device to ensure the provision of green services in the Netherlands: a political economy perspective," 2014 International Congress, August 26-29, 2014, Ljubljana, Slovenia 186674, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:eaae14:186674
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.186674
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Westerink, Judith & Jongeneel, Roel & Polman, Nico & Prager, Katrin & Franks, Jeremy & Dupraz, Pierre & Mettepenningen, Evy, 2017. "Collaborative governance arrangements to deliver spatially coordinated agri-environmental management," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 176-192.

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    Keywords

    Agricultural and Food Policy; Environmental Economics and Policy; Farm Management; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Political Economy;
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