[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/zewdip/7295.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Public Interest vs. Interest Groups: Allowance Allocation in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme

Author

Listed:
  • Anger, Niels
  • Böhringer, Christoph
  • Oberndorfer, Ulrich
Abstract
This paper presents a political-economy analysis of allowance allocation in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). A common-agency model suggests that a politicalsupport maximizing government considers the preferences of sectoral interest groups besides public interest when allocating emissions permits. In the stylized model, industries represented by more powerful lobby groups face a lower regulatory burden, which for sufficiently high lobbying power leads to an inefficient emissions regulation. An empirical analysis of the first trading phase of the EU ETS corroborates our theoretical prediction for a cross-section of German firms, but also shows that the political-economy determinants of permit allocation depend on firm characteristics. We find that large carbon emitters that were heavily exposed to emissions regulation and simultaneously represented by powerful interest groups received higher levels of emissions allowances. In contrast, industrial lobbying power stand-alone or threats of potential worker layoffs did not exert a significant influence on the EU ETS allocation process.

Suggested Citation

  • Anger, Niels & Böhringer, Christoph & Oberndorfer, Ulrich, 2008. "Public Interest vs. Interest Groups: Allowance Allocation in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-023, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:7295
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/24718/1/dp08023.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cramton, Peter & Kerr, Suzi, 2002. "Tradeable carbon permit auctions: How and why to auction not grandfather," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 333-345, March.
    2. Barbara Buchner & Carlo Carraro & A. Denny Ellerman, 2006. "The Allocation of European Union Allowances: Lessons, Unifying Themes and General Principles," Working Papers 0615, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research.
    3. Peterson, Sonja, 2006. "Efficient abatement in separated carbon markets: A theoretical and quantitative analysis of the EU emissions trading scheme," Kiel Working Papers 1271, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    4. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    5. Christoph Böhringer & Andreas Lange, 2005. "Economic Implications of Alternative Allocation Schemes for Emission Allowances," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 107(3), pages 563-581, September.
    6. Eric Nævdal & Richard Brazee, 2000. "A Guide to Extracting Information from Environmental Pressure Groups," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 16(1), pages 105-119, May.
    7. Barbara Buchner & Denny Ellerman, 2006. "Over-Allocation or Abatement? A Preliminary Analysis of the Eu Ets Based on the 2005 Emissions Data," Working Papers 2006.139, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    8. Kirchgassner, Gebhard & Schneider, Friedrich, 2003. "On the Political Economy of Environmental Policy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 115(3-4), pages 369-396, June.
    9. Wallace E. Oates & Paul R. Portney & Wallace E. Oates & Paul R. Portney, 2004. "The Political Economy of Environmental Policy," Chapters, in: Environmental Policy and Fiscal Federalism, chapter 1, pages 3-30, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    10. Anger, Niels & Oberndorfer, Ulrich, 2008. "Firm performance and employment in the EU emissions trading scheme: An empirical assessment for Germany," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 12-22, January.
    11. Christoph Bohringer & Tim Hoffmann & Andreas Lange & Andreas Loschel & Ulf Moslener, 2005. "Assessing Emission Regulation in Europe: An Interactive Simulation Approach," The Energy Journal, , vol. 26(4), pages 1-22, October.
    12. Dijkstra, Bouwe R., 1998. "A two-stage rent-seeking contest for instrument choice and revenue division, applied to environmental policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 281-301, May.
    13. Anger, Niels & Böhringer, Christoph & Lange, Andreas, 2006. "Differentiation of Green Taxes: A Political-Economy Analysis for Germany," ZEW Discussion Papers 06-003, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    14. Löschel, Andreas & Lange, Andreas & Hoffmann, Tim & Böhringer, Christoph & Moslener, Ulf, 2004. "Assessing Emission Allocation in Europe: An Interactive Simulation Approach," ZEW Discussion Papers 04-40, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    15. Fredriksson, Per G., 1997. "The Political Economy of Pollution Taxes in a Small Open Economy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 44-58, May.
    16. Julien A. Hanoteau, 2003. "Lobbying for Emissions Allowances: A New Perspective on the Political Economy of the US Acid Rain Program," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 93(1), pages 289-314, January-F.
    17. Aidt, Toke S., 1998. "Political internalization of economic externalities and environmental policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 1-16, July.
    18. Steffen Kallbekken, 2005. "The cost of sectoral differentiation in the EU emissions trading scheme," Climate Policy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 5(1), pages 47-60, January.
    19. Ellerman, A. Denny & Buchner, Barbara K., 2006. "Over-Allocation or Abatement? A Preliminary Analysis of the Eu Ets Based on the 2005 Emissions Data," Climate Change Modelling and Policy Working Papers 12062, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gawel, Erik & Lehmann, Paul & Purkus, Alexandra & Söderholm, Patrik & Witte, Katherina, 2016. "The rationales for technology-specific renewable energy support: Conceptual arguments and their relevance for Germany," UFZ Discussion Papers 4/2016, Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research (UFZ), Division of Social Sciences (ÖKUS).
    2. Christoph Böhringer, 2014. "Two Decades of European Climate Policy: A Critical Appraisal," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 8(1), pages 1-17, January.
    3. Sebastian Strunz, Erik Gawel, and Paul Lehmann, 2015. "Towards a general Europeanization of EU Member States energy policies?," Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2).
    4. Paul Lehmann & Patrik Söderholm, 2018. "Can Technology-Specific Deployment Policies Be Cost-Effective? The Case of Renewable Energy Support Schemes," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 71(2), pages 475-505, October.
    5. Gawel, Erik & Lehmann, Paul & Purkus, Alexandra & Söderholm, Patrik & Witte, Katherina, 2017. "Rationales for technology-specific RES support and their relevance for German policy," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 16-26.
    6. Böhringer, Christoph & Rosendahl, Knut Einar, 2009. "Strategic partitioning of emission allowances under the EU Emission Trading Scheme," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 182-197, August.
    7. Ashwin Rode, 2021. "Rent Seeking over Tradable Emission Permits," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 78(2), pages 257-285, February.
    8. Sijm, Jos & Lehmann, Paul & Chewpreecha, Unnada & Gawel, Erik & Mercure, Jean-Francois & Pollitt, Hector & Strunz, Sebastian, 2014. "EU climate and energy policy beyond 2020: Are additional targets and instruments for renewables economically reasonable?," UFZ Discussion Papers 3/2014, Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research (UFZ), Division of Social Sciences (ÖKUS).
    9. Eyckmans, Johan & Rousseau, Sandra, 2009. "The European Emissions Trading System in Belgium," Working Papers 2009/26, Hogeschool-Universiteit Brussel, Faculteit Economie en Management.
    10. Hieronymi, Philipp & Schüller, David, 2015. "The Clean-Development Mechanism, stochastic permit prices and energy investments," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 25-36.
    11. Gawel, Erik & Strunz, Sebastian & Lehmann, Paul, 2014. "Wie viel Europa braucht die Energiewende?," UFZ Discussion Papers 4/2014, Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research (UFZ), Division of Social Sciences (ÖKUS).
    12. Elias Asproudis & Thomas Weyman-Jones, 2020. "How the ENGOs Can Fight the Industrial/Business Lobby with Their Tools from Their Own Field? ENGOs Participation in Emissions Trading Market," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(20), pages 1-13, October.
    13. Mizrach, Bruce, 2012. "Integration of the global carbon markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 335-349.
    14. Gawel, Erik & Strunz, Sebastian & Lehmann, Paul, 2014. "A public choice view on the climate and energy policy mix in the EU — How do the emissions trading scheme and support for renewable energies interact?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 175-182.
    15. Christoph Böhringer, 2010. "1990 bis 2010: Eine Bestandsaufnahme von zwei Jahrzehnten europäischer Klimapolitik," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 11(s1), pages 56-74, May.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Niels Anger & Christoph Böhringer & Andreas Lange, 2015. "The political economy of energy tax differentiation across industries: theory and empirical evidence," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 78-98, February.
    2. Anger, Niels & Böhringer, Christoph & Lange, Andreas, 2006. "Differentiation of Green Taxes: A Political-Economy Analysis for Germany," ZEW Discussion Papers 06-003, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    3. Leo Wangler & Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2013. "The political economy of international environmental agreements: a survey," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 387-403, September.
    4. Pablo Río & Xavier Labandeira, 2009. "Barriers to the introduction of market-based instruments in climate policies: an integrated theoretical framework," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 10(1), pages 41-68, March.
    5. Claudia Kemfert & Friedrich Schneider, 2009. "Der Emissionshandel in Deutschland und Österreich – ein wirksames Instrument des Klimaschutzes?," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 10(1), pages 92-122, February.
    6. Ian A. MacKenzie, 2017. "Rent creation and rent seeking in environmental policy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 171(1), pages 145-166, April.
    7. Drosdowski, Thomas, 2006. "On the Link Between Democracy and Environment," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-355, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    8. E. Woerdman & O. Couwenberg & A. Nentjes, 2009. "Energy prices and emissions trading: windfall profits from grandfathering?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 185-202, October.
    9. Anger, Niels & Oberndorfer, Ulrich, 2008. "Firm performance and employment in the EU emissions trading scheme: An empirical assessment for Germany," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 12-22, January.
    10. Jurate Jaraite-Ka~ukauske and Corrado Di Maria, 2016. "Did the EU ETS Make a Difference? An Empirical Assessment Using Lithuanian Firm-Level Data," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1).
    11. Stavins, Robert, 2004. "Introduction to the Political Economy of Environmental Regulations," RFF Working Paper Series dp-04-12, Resources for the Future.
    12. Achim Voß, 2015. "How Disagreement About Social Costs Leads to Inefficient Energy-Productivity Investment," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 60(4), pages 521-548, April.
    13. Grey, Felix, 2018. "Corporate lobbying for environmental protection," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 23-40.
    14. Dapeng Cai & Jie Li, 2020. "Pollution for Sale: Firms’ Characteristics and Lobbying Outcome," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 77(3), pages 539-564, November.
    15. Isabelle Cadoret & Fabio Padovano, 2018. "Derterminants and consequences of the stringency of environmental policies: an empirical test," Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS 2018-04-ccr, Condorcet Center for political Economy.
    16. Roelfsema, Hein, 2007. "Strategic delegation of environmental policy making," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 270-275, March.
    17. Olper, Alessandro, 2017. "The political economy of trade-related regulatory policy: environment and global value chain," Bio-based and Applied Economics Journal, Italian Association of Agricultural and Applied Economics (AIEAA), vol. 5(3), February.
    18. Canton, Joan, 2008. "Redealing the cards: How an eco-industry modifies the political economy of environmental taxes," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 295-315, August.
    19. MacKenzie, Ian A. & Ohndorf, Markus, 2012. "Cap-and-trade, taxes, and distributional conflict," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 51-65.
    20. Hiroaki Yamagami & Ryo Arawatari & Takeo Hori, 2021. "Ambitious Emissions Goal as a Strategic Preemption," Strategic Behavior and the Environment, now publishers, vol. 9(1-2), pages 145-174, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Emissions trading; interest groups; regression analysis;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
    • C10 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:7295. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/zemande.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.