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Corporate governance, market discipline, and productivity growth

Author

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  • Köke, Jens
Abstract
Using a large panel of German manufacturing firms over the years 1986?1996, this study examines the impact of corporate governance and market discipline on productivity growth. We find that firms under concentrated ownership tend to show significantly higher productivity growth. Financial pressure from creditors influences productivity growth positively, particularly for firms in financial distress. Regarding market discipline, productivity grows faster when competition on product markets is intense, but only when owner concentration is high. We do not find evidence that the type of the owner, ownership complexity, or the size of the supervisory board is significantly related to productivity growth.

Suggested Citation

  • Köke, Jens, 2001. "Corporate governance, market discipline, and productivity growth," ZEW Discussion Papers 01-55, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:5411
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Bozec, Richard & Dia, Mohamed, 2007. "Board structure and firm technical efficiency: Evidence from Canadian state-owned enterprises," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 177(3), pages 1734-1750, March.
    3. Ujjayini Roy & Indrani Chakraborty, 2024. "Market concentration, promoter ownership and firm performance: evidence from Indian corporate firms," Indian Economic Review, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 27-85, June.
    4. Manoranjan Pattanayak Author- Workplace-Name: CRISIL LIMITED & Manoj Pant, "undated". "Corporate Governance, Competition and Firm Performance: Evidence from India," Centre for International Trade and Development, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi Discussion Papers 10-07, Centre for International Trade and Development, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.
    5. Richard Bozec, 2005. "Boards of Directors, Market Discipline and Firm Performance," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(9-10), pages 1921-1960.
    6. Richard Bozec, 2005. "Boards of Directors, Market Discipline and Firm Performance," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(9‐10), pages 1921-1960, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    competition; corporate governance; productivity; ownership structure;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D24 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity

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