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No Smoking Gun: Private Shareholders, Governance Rules and Central Bank Financial Behavior

Author

Listed:
  • Bartels, Bernd
  • Weder di Mauro, Beatrice
  • Eichengreen, Barry
Abstract
Das vorliegende Manuskript untersucht den Zusammenhang zwischen Regeln zur finanziellen Unabhängigkeit von Zentralbanken und deren Finanzkraft. Wir studieren die Regeln und Bilanzdaten von 35 Zentralbanken in der OECD mit dem Ziel herauszuarbeiten, ob die Eigentümerstruktur der Bank (privat oder staatlich geführt), ihre Gewinnverteilungsregeln, Besteuerungsgesetze, Rückstellungsregeln und andere Bilanzierungsregeln die Höhe von Gewinnen, deren Verteilung, sowie die Höhe der Reserven beeinflusst.

Suggested Citation

  • Bartels, Bernd & Weder di Mauro, Beatrice & Eichengreen, Barry, 2017. "No Smoking Gun: Private Shareholders, Governance Rules and Central Bank Financial Behavior," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168251, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168251
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    2. Mr. Peter Stella & Mr. Ulrich H Klueh, 2008. "Central Bank Financial Strength and Policy Performance: An Econometric Evaluation," IMF Working Papers 2008/176, International Monetary Fund.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde & Daniel Sanches & Linda Schilling & Harald Uhlig, 2021. "Central Bank Digital Currency: Central Banking For All?," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 41, pages 225-242, July.
    2. Pinter, Julien & Pourroy, Marc, 2023. "How can financial constraints force a central bank to exit a currency peg? An application to the Swiss franc peg," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    3. Hampl, Mojmir & Havranek, Tomas, 2018. "Central Bank Capital as an Instrument of Monetary Policy," EconStor Preprints 176828, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    4. Mojmir Hampl & Tomas Havranek, 2020. "Central Bank Equity as an Instrument of Monetary Policy," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 62(1), pages 49-68, March.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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