[go: up one dir, main page]

IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/ubwwpe/20072.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

More about economic and non-economic determinants of (mutual) trust and trustworthiness

Author

Listed:
  • Sell, Friedrich L.
Abstract
The aim of this paper is threefold: we first discuss the appropriateness of the traditional trust-game-tree for the analysis of trust relationships. Following the definition put forward by Lee et al. (2005) that confident expectations and a willingness to be vulnerable are critical components of all definitions of trust, we relate these criteria to the subjective probabilities given by Coleman's inequality. Then, we develop the trust-tree-game further to a psychological trust game in the vein of Dufwenberg (2002). Here, we complement the concept of trust responsiveness with the idea of honouring trust responsiveness which enables us to consider the issue of mutuality in trustrelationships. In a second step, we move on to the concept of mutual trust (which is more than some degree of mutuality in a trust relationship), where each individual can be both trustor and trustee. This aspect is visualized within the two-person optimal intertemporal consumption choice model.The corresponding creditor-debtor-game reproduces the well known prisoner's dilemma. In a third step we analyse in depth how the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is related to trust and trust worthiness in (inter)national credit contracts. The fact that we observe multiple creditor-debtor-relationships in an economy seems to reflect not only the gains from cooperation in repeated games, but also the existence of generalized trust in the society.

Suggested Citation

  • Sell, Friedrich L., 2007. "More about economic and non-economic determinants of (mutual) trust and trustworthiness," Working Papers in Economics 2007,2, Bundeswehr University Munich, Economic Research Group.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ubwwpe:20072
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/32836/1/551163984.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Martin Bandulet & Karl Morasch, 2005. "Would You Like to be a Prosumer? Information Revelation, Personalization and Price Discrimination in Electronic Markets," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(2), pages 251-271.
    2. Bohl, Martin T. & Sell, Friedrich L., 2002. "The demand for money by private firms in a regulated economy: Theoretical underpinnings and empirical evidence for Germany 1960-1998," Working Papers in Economics 2002,3, Bundeswehr University Munich, Economic Research Group.
    3. Friedrich L. Sell & Marcus Wiens, 2006. "Vertrauen: Substitut oder Komplement zu formellen Institutionen?," Schmollers Jahrbuch : Journal of Applied Social Science Studies / Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, vol. 126(4), pages 605-633.
    4. Sell, Friedrich L., 1999. "Die EWWU als Club: Positive und normative Implikationen für den Beitritt mittel- und osteuropäischer Reformstaaten," Working Papers in Economics 1999,4, Bundeswehr University Munich, Economic Research Group.
    5. Sell, Friedrich L., 2000. "Is there a policy of optimal wage and income differentiation? A macroeconomic perspective," Working Papers in Economics 2000,1, Bundeswehr University Munich, Economic Research Group.
    6. Jochem, Axel, 2000. "Timing and sequenzing der monetären Integration," Working Papers in Economics 2000,2, Bundeswehr University Munich, Economic Research Group.
    7. Mittendorf, Marcus & Sell, Friedrich L., 2002. "Die Ergebnisse des Bonner Klimagipfels: Strategisches Verhandeln unter den Bedingungen globaler Umweltgüter," Working Papers in Economics 2002,2, Bundeswehr University Munich, Economic Research Group.
    8. Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt, 1994. "Competition Or Co-Operation: On The Evolutionary Economics Of Trust, Exploitation And Moral Attitudes," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(2), pages 155-187, June.
    9. Bandulet, Martin & Morasch, Karl, 2002. "Electronic coordination in oligopolistic markets: Impact on transport costs and product differentiation," Working Papers in Economics 2002,4, Bundeswehr University Munich, Economic Research Group.
    10. Jochem, Axel, 1999. "Währungspolitische Interdependenz der EU-Beitrittskandidaten und die Wahl eines geeigneten Wechselkurssystems," Working Papers in Economics 1999,5, Bundeswehr University Munich, Economic Research Group.
    11. Guth, Werner & Ockenfels, Peter & Wendel, Markus, 1997. "Cooperation based on trust. An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 15-43, February.
    12. Sell, Friedrich L., 2001. "Braucht es monetäre und reale Konvergenz für eine (in einer) Währungsunion? Anmerkungen zu einer aktuellen Debatte," Working Papers in Economics 2001,1, Bundeswehr University Munich, Economic Research Group.
    13. Sell Friedrich L., 2004. "Währungspolitik Im Dienste Von Entwicklung: Immer Noch Ein Forschungsprogramm," Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 53(2), pages 123-150, August.
    14. Sell, Friedrich L., 2004. "Confidence and the Erosion of Confidence: Economic Functions and Effects," Working Papers in Economics 2004,1, Bundeswehr University Munich, Economic Research Group.
    15. Bartholomae Florian & Morasch Karl, 2007. "Oil Price Indexing Of Natural Gas Prices: An Economic Analysis," Review of Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 58(3), pages 250-264, December.
    16. Sell, Friedrich L., 2004. "Währungspolitik im Dienste von Entwicklung: Immer noch ein Forschungsprogramm!," Working Papers in Economics 2004,2, Bundeswehr University Munich, Economic Research Group.
    17. Sell, Friedrich L., 2005. "Zins- und Geldmengensteuerung in der offenen Volkswirtschaft: Eine Referenz an William Poole (und zugleich eine Kritik an der "Neuen Keynesianischen Makroökonomik")," Working Papers in Economics 2005,2, Bundeswehr University Munich, Economic Research Group.
    18. Izquierdo Llanes, Gregorio, 1999. "Harmonization and tax competition: Efficiency versus fairness," Working Papers in Economics 1999,2, Bundeswehr University Munich, Economic Research Group.
    19. Sell, Friedrich L., 2006. "The New Exchange Rate Policy in the Emerging Market Economies: with Special Emphasis on China," Working Papers in Economics 2006,2, Bundeswehr University Munich, Economic Research Group.
    20. Morasch, Karl, 2003. "Deciding about (de-)centralization of industrial policy: Delegation by a central authority vs. bargaining of regional governments," Working Papers in Economics 2003,3, Bundeswehr University Munich, Economic Research Group.
    21. Bartholomae, Florian W., 2006. "Trade And Pension Systems," Working Papers in Economics 2006,1, Bundeswehr University Munich, Economic Research Group.
    22. Guerra, Gerardo & John Zizzo, Daniel, 2004. "Trust responsiveness and beliefs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 25-30, September.
    23. Michael Bacharach & Gerardo A. Guerra & Daniel John Zizzo, 2001. "Is Trust Self-Fulfilling? An Experimental Study," Economics Series Working Papers 76, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    24. Dumke, Rolf H, 1990. "Reassessing the Wirtschaftswunder: Reconstruction and Postwar Growth in West Germany in an International Context," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 52(4), pages 451-491, Special I.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ryan Murphy & Amnon Rapoport & James Parco, 2006. "The breakdown of cooperation in iterative real-time trust dilemmas," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 9(2), pages 147-166, June.
    2. Brian S. Collins & Robin Mansell, 2004. "Cyber trust and crime prevention: a synthesis of the state-of-the-art science reviews," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 4252, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. Greiner, Ben & Vittoria Levati, M., 2005. "Indirect reciprocity in cyclical networks: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 711-731, October.
    4. Alessandro Innocenti & Maria Grazia Pazienza, 2006. "Altruism and Gender in the Trust Game," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 005, University of Siena.
    5. Guerra, Gerardo & John Zizzo, Daniel, 2004. "Trust responsiveness and beliefs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 25-30, September.
    6. Michael Bacharach & Gerardo Guerra & Daniel Zizzo, 2007. "The Self-Fulfilling Property of Trust: An Experimental Study," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 63(4), pages 349-388, December.
    7. Buskens, Vincent, 2003. "Trust in triads: effects of exit, control, and learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 235-252, February.
    8. ATTANASI Giuseppe & NAGEL Rosemarie, 2008. "A Survey of Psychological Games: Theoretical Findings and Experimental Evidence," LERNA Working Papers 08.07.251, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
    9. Sell, Friedrich L. & Kermer, Silvio, 2006. "William Poole in der modernen Makroökonomik: Exegese des ursprünglichen Beitrags und seiner Fortentwicklungen für die offene Volkswirtschaft," Working Papers in Economics 2006,3, Bundeswehr University Munich, Economic Research Group.
    10. Ederer, Florian & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2017. "Promises and expectations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 161-178.
    11. van de Klundert, T.C.M.J. & Smulders, J.A., 1991. "Reconstructing growth theory : A survey," Other publications TiSEM 19355c51-17eb-4d5d-aa66-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    12. J. Bradford De Long and Barry Eichengreen., 1991. "The Marshall Plan: History's Most Successful Structural Adjustment Program," Economics Working Papers 91-184, University of California at Berkeley.
    13. Sandra Ludwig & Julia Nafziger, 2011. "Beliefs about overconfidence," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 70(4), pages 475-500, April.
    14. Burks, Stephen V. & Carpenter, Jeffrey P. & Verhoogen, Eric, 2003. "Playing both roles in the trust game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 195-216, June.
    15. Friedel Bolle & Jessica Kaehler, 2006. "Coleman's Hypothesis on trusting behaviour and a remark on meta-studies," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(4), pages 469-483.
    16. Giuseppe Attanasi & Pierpaolo Battigalli & Elena Manzoni, 2016. "Incomplete-Information Models of Guilt Aversion in the Trust Game," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(3), pages 648-667, March.
    17. Güth, Werner & Ockenfels, Axel, 2005. "The coevolution of morality and legal institutions: an indirect evolutionary approach," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(2), pages 155-174, December.
    18. repec:cte:whrepe:wp06-05 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Pelligra, Vittorio, 2010. "Trust responsiveness. On the dynamics of fiduciary interactions," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 39(6), pages 653-660, December.
    20. Attanasi, Giuseppe & Rimbaud, Claire & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2019. "Embezzlement and guilt aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 409-429.
    21. Eichengreen, Barry, 1994. "The Bretton Woods System: Paradise Lost?," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers 233394, University of California-Berkeley, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    trust; psychological game theory; intertemporal consumption;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D69 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Other
    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:ubwwpe:20072. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ivbwmde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.