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Zur Rückkehr der Machtpolitik in Handelsfragen: Theoretische Überlegungen und politische Empfehlungen

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  • Felbermayr, Gabriel J.
Abstract
Opportunistische Regierungen haben vielfache Anreize, unilateral vom Freihandel abzuweichen, zum Beispiel um ihre Terms of trade zu verbessern. Doch was individuell rational sein mag, führt kollektiv in eine Situation, in der alle Länder schlechter gestellt sind, und aus der sie nur schwer herausfinden. Die neuere Forschung zeigt, dass es das Prinzip der Reziprozität im GATT/WTO-System ermöglicht hat, aus diesem Gefangenendilemma auszubrechen. Das Prinzip stellt sicher, dass bei Zollsenkungen die Terms of trade der Länder konstant bleiben, so dass alle Beteiligten profitieren. Reziprozität bedeutet auch, dass der Bruch von Vereinbarungen durch streng reglementierte "Gegenzölle" kompensiert werden darf. Die glaubwürdige Drohung mit solchen Maßnahmen ist das einzige Mittel, opportunistisches Verhalten in Schach zu halten und die Stabilität der multilateralen Ordnung zu bewahren. Daher ist es auch richtig, dass die EU auf die unter dem Vorwand der Bedrohung der nationalen Sicherheit erhobenen amerikanischen Zölle auf Stahl und Aluminium mit maßvollen Vergeltungszöllen reagiert hat.

Suggested Citation

  • Felbermayr, Gabriel J., 2018. "Zur Rückkehr der Machtpolitik in Handelsfragen: Theoretische Überlegungen und politische Empfehlungen," Open Access Publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy 225505, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkie:225505
    DOI: 10.1515/pwp-2018-0027
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Krugman, Paul, 1980. "Scale Economies, Product Differentiation, and the Pattern of Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(5), pages 950-959, December.
    2. Gabriel Felbermayr & Benjamin Jung, 2012. "Unilateral Trade Liberalization in the Melitz Model: A Note," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(2), pages 1724-1730.
    3. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2012. "Profit Shifting And Trade Agreements In Imperfectly Competitive Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(4), pages 1067-1104, November.
    4. Gabriel Felbermayr & Alexander-Nikolai Sandkamp, 2018. "Trumps Importzölle auf Stahl und Aluminium," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 71(06), pages 30-37, March.
    5. John Kennan & Raymond Riezman, 2013. "Do Big Countries Win Tariff Wars?," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Raymond Riezman (ed.), International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, chapter 4, pages 45-51, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
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    9. Gabriel Felbermayr, 2018. "Zölle im transatlantischen Handel: Worauf, wie viel und wie gerecht?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 71(06), pages 24-29, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Berend Diekmann, 2020. "Globale Handelsordnung — mit den oder ohne die USA?," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 100(5), pages 324-328, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Handelspolitik; Optimalzolltheorie; Spieltheorie;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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