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Incentivierung des Managements bei Unternehmenskäufen/Buy-Outs mit Private Equity Investoren - eine empirische Untersuchung

Author

Listed:
  • Schalast, Christoph
  • Buxkaemper, Marius
  • Büchler, Christian
  • Wedel, Gregor
Abstract
Since years, incentives for the management have become a standard upon acquisitions of companies by Private Equity Investors - so-called Buy-Outs. However, until this date there are no empirical studies available on the arrangements of management participations and potential conflicts of interest especially on occasion of sales from one Private Equity Investor to another - so-called Secondary Buy-Outs. This present study is based on a survey among Private Equity Investors and Management Teams in companies controlled by Private Equity Investors. It shows a high degree of sensibility of all parties concerned for the issue of incentives and the potential conflict of interest involved with it. It also showed that market standards for management incentives have developed in the meantime. In practice, the instrument to prevent conflicts is therefore the transparency of the transaction. The only way to prevent criminal and civil consequences (damages) for the managers involved, as well as obstructing or even frustrating the process as a whole, is an open and transparent communication about the selling process and possible concepts of incentives between all parties concerned, i.e. seller, buyer and the management involved. Despite the frequency of such transactions there are - until today - no market standards or guide lines for this necessary transparency. The present study intends to create initial groundwork for this.

Suggested Citation

  • Schalast, Christoph & Buxkaemper, Marius & Büchler, Christian & Wedel, Gregor, 2011. "Incentivierung des Managements bei Unternehmenskäufen/Buy-Outs mit Private Equity Investoren - eine empirische Untersuchung," Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series 161, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:fsfmwp:161
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Inklaar, Robert & Koetter, Michael & Noth, Felix, 2012. "Who's afraid of big bad banks? Bank competition, SME, and industry growth," Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series 197, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management.
    2. Dietmar Harhoff & Elisabeth Mueller & John Van Reenen, 2014. "What are the Channels for Technology Sourcing? Panel Data Evidence from German Companies," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(1), pages 204-224, March.
    3. Boeing, Philipp & Mueller, Elisabeth & Sandner, Philipp, 2012. "What makes Chinese firms productive? Learning from indigenous and foreign sources of knowledge," Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series 196, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management.
    4. Kostka, Genia & Moslener, Ulf & Andreas, Jan G., 2011. "Barriers to energy efficiency improvement: Empirical evidence from small-and-medium sized enterprises in China," Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series 178, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management.
    5. Alexander Libman & Vladimir Kozlov & André Schultz, 2012. "Roving Bandits in Action: Outside Option and Governmental Predation in Autocracies," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(4), pages 526-562, November.
    6. Yu, Xiaofan, 2011. "A spatial interpretation of the persistency of China's provincial inequality," Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series 171, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management.
    7. Böing, Philipp & Müller, Elisabeth, 2012. "Technological Capabilities of Chinese Enterprises: Who is Going to Compete Abroad?," VfS Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 62081, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Management Buy-Out; MBO; Management Buy-In; MBI; Leveraged Buy-Out; Private Equity; Secondary Buy-Out; Managementbeteiligung; Beteiligungsvertrag; Bad-Leaver/Good-Leaver; Interessenkonflikt; Beteiligungsquote; Garantien; Exit; Incentivierung; Reporting; Transparenz;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
    • K19 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Other
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • K29 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Other

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