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Claims to Legitimacy Matter: Why Sanctions Fail to Instigate Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes

Author

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  • Grauvogel, Julia
  • von Soest, Christian
Abstract
International sanctions have been one of the most commonly used tools of Western foreign policy in the post-Cold War era to instigate democratization globally. However, despite long-term external pressure through sanctions imposed by the European Union, the United States and/or the United Nations, nondemocratic rule in cases such as Belarus, Cuba, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea and Syria has proven to be extremely persistent. In this paper, we analyze a new global dataset on sanctions from 1990 to 2011 and assess which international and domestic factors account for the persistence of nondemocratic rule in targeted regimes. The results of a fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) of 120 episodes of sanctions provide new insights for the research on both sanctions and authoritarian regimes. Most significantly, sanctions strengthen nondemocratic rule if the regime manages to incorporate their existence into its legitimation strategy. Such a rally-round-the-flag effect occurs most often in cases where comprehensive sanctions targeting the entire population are imposed on regimes that enjoy strong claims to legitimacy and have only limited linkages to the sanction sender.

Suggested Citation

  • Grauvogel, Julia & von Soest, Christian, 2013. "Claims to Legitimacy Matter: Why Sanctions Fail to Instigate Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes," GIGA Working Papers 235, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:gigawp:235
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    3. Roel Dom & Lionel Roger, 2018. "Economic sanctions and domestic debt: Burundi's fiscal response to the suspension of budget support," Discussion Papers 2018-12, University of Nottingham, CREDIT.
    4. Mariachiara Barzotto & Lisa De Propris, 2021. "The value of firm linkages in the age of industry 4.0: a qualitative comparative analysis," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 67(2), pages 245-272, October.
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    6. Yulia S. Timofeeva, 2021. "US Sanctions Against Financial Companies: Key Features," Finansovyj žhurnal — Financial Journal, Financial Research Institute, Moscow 125375, Russia, issue 4, pages 39-51, August.
    7. William Seitz & Alberto Zazzaro, 2020. "Sanctions and public opinion: The case of the Russia-Ukraine gas disputes," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 817-843, October.
    8. von Soest, Christian & Grauvogel, Julia, 2015. "How Do Non-Democratic Regimes Claim Legitimacy? Comparative Insights from Post-Soviet Countries," GIGA Working Papers 277, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
    9. Anastasia Kazun, 2016. "Rally-Around-The-Flag and the Media: Case of Economic Sanctions in Russia," HSE Working papers WP BRP 33/PS/2016, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    10. Dukalskis, Alexander & Gerschewski, Johannes, 2020. "Adapting or Freezing? Ideological Reactions of Communist Regimes to a Post-Communist World," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 55(3), pages 511-532.
    11. Alexander Libman & Björn Vollan, 2019. "Anti-Western Conspiracy Thinking in China and Russia: Empirical Evidence and its Link to Expectations of Collusion," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 135-163, December.
    12. Golub Jonathan, 2020. "Improving Analyses of Sanctions Busting," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 26(2), pages 1-20, May.
    13. Tannenberg, Marcus & Bernhard, Michael & Gerschewski, Johannes & Lührmann, Anna & von Soest, Christian, 2021. "Claiming the right to rule: regime legitimation strategies from 1900 to 2019," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 13(1), pages 77-94.

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