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Easy targets and the timing of conflict

Author

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  • Bester, Helmut
  • Konrad, Kai A.
Abstract
Contestants have to choose whether to initiate a contest or war, or whether to remain peaceful for another period. We find that agents wait and initiate the contest once their rival is sufficiently weak to be an easy target.

Suggested Citation

  • Bester, Helmut & Konrad, Kai A., 2003. "Easy targets and the timing of conflict," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 21, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cegedp:21
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Stergios Skaperdas, 2006. "Bargaining Versus Fighting," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(6), pages 657-676.
    2. Gilles Grandjean & Petros G. Sekeris, 2017. "The timing of contests," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(2), pages 137-149, March.
    3. Juan M. C. Larrosa, 2016. "Arms build-up and arms race in optimal economic growth," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 12(2), pages 167-182, June.
    4. Friedel Bolle & Jonathan H. W. Tan & Daniel John Zizzo, 2014. "Vendettas," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 93-130, May.
    5. Michael McBride & Stergios Skaperdas, 2005. "Explaining Conflict in Low-Income Countries: Incomplete Contracting in the Shadow of the Future," CESifo Working Paper Series 1636, CESifo.
    6. J. Atsu Amegashie & Marco Runkel, 2012. "The Paradox of Revenge in Conflicts," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 56(2), pages 313-330, April.
    7. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2007. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 22, pages 649-709, Elsevier.
    8. Beviá, Carmen & Corchón, Luis C., 2010. "Peace agreements without commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 469-487, March.
    9. Daniel Lee, 2008. "Going once, going twice, sold! The committee assignment process as an all-pay auction," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(3), pages 237-255, June.
    10. Vladimir Petkov, 2023. "Prize formation and sharing in multi-stage contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(1), pages 259-289, January.
    11. Amegashie, J. Atsu & Kutsoati, Edward, 2007. "(Non)intervention in intra-state conflicts," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 754-767, September.
    12. Amegashie, J. Atsu & Runkel, Marco, 2008. "The Desire for Revenge and the Dynamics of Conflicts," MPRA Paper 6746, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Libman, Alexander Mikhailovich, 2009. "Эндогенные Границы И Распределение Власти В Федерациях И Международных Сообществах [ENDOGENOUS BOUNDARIES AND DISTRIBUTION OF POWER In the Federation]," MPRA Paper 16473, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Friedel Bolle & Jonathan H. W. Tan & Daniel John Zizzo, 2014. "Vendettas," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 93-130, May.
    15. Johannes Münster, 2007. "Contests with investment," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(8), pages 849-862.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Timing of conflict; war; easy targets;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B31 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought: Individuals - - - Individuals
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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