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When does mandatory price disclosure lower prices? Evidence from the German fuel market

Author

Listed:
  • Montag, Felix
  • Sagimuldina, Alina
  • Winter, Christoph
Abstract
The widespread availability of digital technologies has made mandatory price disclosure policies (MPD) a convenient tool for policymakers to increase price transparency and foster competition. The literature has shown that these can increase or decrease prices. We shed light on the circumstances under which MPD lowers prices. We study the introduction of MPD in the German retail fuel market by combining a stylized theoretical model with detailed data on prices, seller characteristics and consumer information. We find that low levels of prior consumer information, a high number of sellers, and complementary information campaigns foster the procompetitive effects of MPD.

Suggested Citation

  • Montag, Felix & Sagimuldina, Alina & Winter, Christoph, 2024. "When does mandatory price disclosure lower prices? Evidence from the German fuel market," Working Papers 344, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cbscwp:300263
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mandatory price disclosure; consumer information; retail fuel market;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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