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Campaign Finance: An Introduction to the Field

Author

Listed:
  • Filip Palda

    (École nationale d'administration publique in Montreal)

Abstract
This is a review of the economics and politics of campaign finance regulation and of the econometrics of the effect of campaign spending on election outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Filip Palda, 2002. "Campaign Finance: An Introduction to the Field," Public Economics 0209005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0209005
    Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on IBM PC; to print on HP;
    as

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    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/pe/papers/0209/0209005.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bender, Bruce, 1988. "An Analysis of Congressional Voting on Legislation Limiting Congressional Campaign Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(5), pages 1005-1021, October.
    2. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph & van Winden, Frans, 1997. "Campaign expenditures, contributions and direct endorsements: The strategic use of information and money to influence voter behavior," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 1-31, February.
    3. Palda, Kristian S, 1975. "The Effect of Expenditure on Political Success," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 745-771, December.
    4. Levitt, Steven D, 1994. "Using Repeat Challengers to Estimate the Effect of Campaign Spending on Election Outcomes in the U.S. House," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 777-798, August.
    5. Abrams, Burton A & Settle, Russell F, 1978. "The Economic Theory of Regulation and Public Financing of Presidential Elections," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(2), pages 245-257, April.
    6. Jeffrey Milyo, 1998. "The Electoral Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: A Natural Experiment Approach," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 9806, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
    7. Lott, John R, Jr, 2000. "A Simple Explanation for Why Campaign Expenditures Are Increasing: The Government Is Getting Bigger," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 359-393, October.
    8. Palda, Filip, 1992. "The Determinants of Campaign Spending: The Role of the Government Jackpot," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(4), pages 627-638, October.
    9. Jacobson, Gary C., 1978. "The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(2), pages 469-491, June.
    10. K. Palda & Kristian Palda, 1985. "Ceilings on campaign spending: Hypothesis and partial test with Canadian data," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 313-331, January.
    11. W. Crain & Robert Tollison & Donald Leavens, 1988. "Laissez-faire in campaign finance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 56(3), pages 201-212, March.
    12. Coates, Dennis, 1998. "Additional Incumbent Spending Really Can Harm (at Least Some) Incumbents: An Analysis of Vote Share Maximization," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1-2), pages 63-87, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Campaign finance; incumbent advantage; industrial organisation of election campaigns;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H - Public Economics

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

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