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Walverine: A Walrasian Trading Agent

Author

Listed:
  • Shih-Fen Cheng

    (Univ Michigan)

  • Evan Leung

    (Univ Michigan)

  • Kevin M. Lochner

    (Univ Michigan)

  • Kevin O'Malley

    (Univ Michigan)

  • Daniel M. Reeves

    (Univ Michigan)

  • L. Julian Schvartzman

    (Univ Michigan)

  • Michael P. Wellman

    (Univ Michigan)

Abstract
TAC-02 was the third in a series of Trading Agent Competition events fostering research in automating trading strategies by showcasing alternate approaches in an open-invitation market game. TAC presents a challenging travel-shopping scenario where agents must satisfy client preferences for complementary and substitutable goods by interacting through a variety of market types. Michigan's entry, Walverine, bases its decisions on a competitive (Walrasian) analysis of the TAC travel economy. Using this Walrasian model, we construct a decision-theoretic formulation of the optimal bidding problem, which Walverine solves in each round of bidding for each good. Walverine's optimal bidding approach, as well as several other features of its overall strategy, are potentially applicable in a broad class of trading environments.

Suggested Citation

  • Shih-Fen Cheng & Evan Leung & Kevin M. Lochner & Kevin O'Malley & Daniel M. Reeves & L. Julian Schvartzman & Michael P. Wellman, 2003. "Walverine: A Walrasian Trading Agent," Computational Economics 0302003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpco:0302003
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 23 . To appear in AAMAS-03. Extended version submitted for publication.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/comp/papers/0302/0302003.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hildenbrand, W. & Kirman, A. P., 1976. "Introduction to Equilibrium Analysis," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 1, number 9780720436068 edited by Bliss, C. J. & Intriligator, M. D..
    2. Wurman, Peter R. & Wellman, Michael P. & Walsh, William E., 2001. "A Parametrization of the Auction Design Space," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 35(1-2), pages 304-338, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Nielsen, Kurt, 2005. "Auctioning Payment Entitlements," 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark 24566, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    2. Kurt Nielsen & Jesper Troelsgaard Nielsen, 2010. "An Allocatively Efficient Auction Market for Payment Entitlements?," MSAP Working Paper Series 03_2010, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
    3. Yoav Shoham & Rob Powers & Trond Grenager, 2006. "If multi-agent learning is the answer, what is the question?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001156, David K. Levine.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    trading agent; trading competition; tatonnement; competitive equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • D58 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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