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Barter in Transition Economies: Competing Explanations Confront Ukranian Data

Author

Listed:
  • Dalia Marin
  • Daniel Kaufmann
  • Bogdan Gorochowskij
Abstract
In this paper we survey the common explanations of barter in transition economies and expose them to detailed survey data on 165 barter deals in Ukraine in 1997. The evidence does not support the notion that soft budget constraints, lack of restructuring, or that the virtual economy are the driving forces behind barter. Further, tax avoidance is only weakly associated with the incidence of barter in Ukraine. We then explore an alternative explanation of barter as a mechanism to address transitional challenges where capital markets and economic institutions are poorly developed. First, barter helps to maintain production by creating a deal-specific collateral which softens the liquidity squeeze in the economy when credit enforcement is prohibitively costly. Second, barter helps to maintain production by preventing firms to be exploited by their input suppliers when suppliers' bargaining position is very strong due to high costs of switching suppliers. Thus, in the absence of trust and functioning capital markets barter is a self-enforcing response to imperfect input and financial markets in the former Soviet Union. The paper concludes by discussing potential long-term costs of barter arrangements, and by suggesting particular pitfalls of expansionary monetary policy in barter economies such as Ukraine and Russia.

Suggested Citation

  • Dalia Marin & Daniel Kaufmann & Bogdan Gorochowskij, 2000. "Barter in Transition Economies: Competing Explanations Confront Ukranian Data," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 287, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    • Handle: RePEc:wdi:papers:2000-287
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Perotti, E. C., 1998. "Inertial credit and opportunistic arrears in transition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(9), pages 1703-1725, November.
    2. Williamson, Oliver E, 1983. "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 519-540, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Marin, Dalia & Schnitzer, Monika, 2005. "Disorganization and financial collapse," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 387-408, February.
    2. Kim, Byung-Yeon & Pirttila, Jukka, 2004. "Money, barter, and inflation in Russia," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 297-314, June.
    3. Guriev, Sergei & Makarov, Igor & Maurel, Mathilde, 2002. "Debt Overhang and Barter in Russia," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 635-656, December.
    4. Jose Noguera, 2004. "The transmission mechanism to barter," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp243, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    5. Marek Gora & Grzegorz Kula & Magdalena Rokicka & Oleksandr Rohozynsky & Anna Ruzik, 2008. "Social Security, Labour Market and Restructuring: Current Situation and Expected Outcomes of Reforms," ESCIRRU Working Papers 5, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    6. Hellman, Joel S. & Jones, Geraint & Kaufmann, Daniel & Schankerman, Mark, 2000. "Measuring governance, corruption, and State capture - how firms and bureaucrats shape the business environment in transition economies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2312, The World Bank.
    7. José Noguera & Susan J. Linz, 2005. "Barter, Credit, and Welfare: A theoretical inquiry into the barter phenomenon in Russia," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp757, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    8. Richard B. Goud Jr., 2002. "Inter-Firm Non-Monetary Transactions in Russia: A Literature Review," Development and Comp Systems 0207001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Vlad Ivanenko & Dmitry Mikheyev, 2002. "The Role of Non-monetary Trade in Russian Transition," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(4), pages 405-419.
    10. Marin, Dalia & Huang, Haizhou & Xu, Chenggang, 2002. "Financial Crisis, Economic Recovery and Banking Development in Former Soviet Union Economies," Discussion Papers in Economics 27, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    11. Chousa, Juan Pineiro & Khan, Haider A. & Melikyan, Davit & Tamazian, Artur, 2005. "Assessing institutional efficiency, growth and integration," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 69-84, April.
    12. Soldatos, Gerasimos T., 2016. "A Short “Second Best” Narrative of the Ukrainian Economy/ Una Breve “Segunda Mejor Opción” de Narrativa de la Economía Ucraniana," MPRA Paper 81714, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Dec 2016.
    13. Vlad Ivanenko, 2004. "Access to liquidity and non-monetary trade in Russia," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(1), pages 21-38.
    14. Luoana D. Santarossa, 2001. "Arrears as a Sign of Financial Repression in Transition Economies - The Case of Romania," CERT Discussion Papers 0104, Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, Heriot Watt University.
    15. Howells, Mark I. & Jonsson, Sandra & Käck, Emilia & Lloyd, Philip & Bennett, Kevin & Leiman, Tony & Conradie, Beatrice, 2010. "Calabashes for kilowatt-hours: Rural energy and market failure," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(6), pages 2729-2738, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    financial crisis; trust; contract enforcement in transition; arrears; the virtual economy; imperfect capital markets;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
    • P30 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - General

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