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Dynamic climate policy with both strategic and non-strategic agents : taxes versus quantities

Author

Listed:
  • Karp, Larry
  • Siddiqui, Sauleh
  • Strand, Jon
Abstract
This paper studies a dynamic game where each of two large blocs, of fossil fuel importers and exporters respectively, sets either taxes or quotas to exercise power in fossil-fuel markets. The main novel feature is the inclusion of a"fringe"of non- strategic (emerging and developing) countries which both consume and produce fossil fuels. Cumulated emissions over time from global fossil fuel consumption create climate damages which are considered by both the strategic importer and the non-strategic countries. Markov perfect equilibria are examined under the four combinations of trade policies and compared with the corresponding static games where climate damages are given (not stock-related). The main results are that taxes always dominate quota policies for both the strategic importer and exporter and that"fringe"countries bene?t from a tax policy as compared with a quota policy for the strategic importer, as the import fuel price then is lower, and the strategic importer's fuel consumption is also lower, thus causing fewer climate damages.

Suggested Citation

  • Karp, Larry & Siddiqui, Sauleh & Strand, Jon, 2013. "Dynamic climate policy with both strategic and non-strategic agents : taxes versus quantities," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6679, The World Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6679
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    19. Liski, Matti & Tahvonen, Olli, 2004. "Can carbon tax eat OPEC's rents?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 1-12, January.
    20. Santiago J. Rubio, 2005. "Tariff Agreements And Non-Renewable Resource International Monopolies: Prices Versus Quantitites," Working Papers. Serie AD 2005-10, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Finus & Bianca Rundshagen, 2016. "Game Theory and Environmental and Resource Economics—In Honour of Alfred Endres, Part Two," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 1-4, September.
    2. Jon Strand, 2019. "Combining Carbon Taxation and Offset Payments: A New Approach to Climate Policy in Low-Income Countries," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 74(3), pages 949-960, November.
    3. Daniel Nachtigall, 2017. "Prices versus Quantities: The Impact of Fracking on the Choice of Climate Policy Instruments in the Presence of OPEC," Working Papers 2017001, Berlin Doctoral Program in Economics and Management Science (BDPEMS).
    4. Nachtigall, Daniel, 2017. "Prices versus quantities: The impact of fracking on the choice of climate policy instruments in the presence of OPEC," Discussion Papers 2017/6, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
    5. Karolina Ryszka & Cees Withagen, 2016. "Unilateral Climate Policies: Incentives and Effects," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(2), pages 471-504, February.
    6. Gökhan Güven, 2024. "The effects of resource export and import taxes on resource conservation and welfare outcomes: triple win or loss reconsidered," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 57(4), pages 1-53, August.
    7. van der Meijden, Gerard & Ryszka, Karolina & Withagen, Cees, 2018. "Double limit pricing," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 153-167.
    8. Strand,Jon, 2021. "Incentivizing Carbon Taxation in Low-Income Countries : Tax Rebating versus Carbon Crediting," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9698, The World Bank.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economic Theory&Research; Climate Change Economics; Markets and Market Access; Debt Markets; Emerging Markets;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • Q41 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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