Free riders and strong reciprocators coexist in public goods experiments: evolutionary foundations
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Other versions of this item:
- Angelo Antoci & Paolo Russu & Luca Zarri, 2010. "Free riders and strong reciprocators coexist in public goods experiments: evolutionary foundations," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(1), pages 720-733.
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Cited by:
- Antoci, Angelo & Russu, Paolo & Zarri, Luca, 2014. "Tax evasion in a behaviorally heterogeneous society: An evolutionary analysis," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 106-115.
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Keywords
Free Riding; Cooperation; Strong Reciprocity; Public Goods Game; Evolutionary Game Theory;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
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