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Hardening a Soft Budget Constraint Through 'Upward Devolution' to a Supranational Institution: The Case of Italian State-Owned Firms and the European Union

Author

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  • Elisabetta Bertero
  • Laura Rondi
Abstract
This paper contributes to the literature on the role of decentralization in hardening the budget constraint of public enterprises. Following Qian and Roland the study adopts a 'federalist' approach. However, it interprets federalism as the upward devolution of domestic economic policies to a supranational authority and examines its role in disciplining public enterprises operating in a soft budget regime. The methodology is a case study of the shift in budget regime in Italy in the late 1980s.

Suggested Citation

  • Elisabetta Bertero & Laura Rondi, 2002. "Hardening a Soft Budget Constraint Through 'Upward Devolution' to a Supranational Institution: The Case of Italian State-Owned Firms and the European Union," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2002-16, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    • Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:dp2002-16
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Elisabetta BERTERO, 2006. "Does a change in the ownership of firms, from public to private, make a difference?," Departmental Working Papers 2006-03, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    2. Elisabetta Bertero & Laura Rondi, 2002. "Does a Switch of Budget Regimes Constrain Managerial Discretion?: Evidence for Italian Public Enterprises' Investment," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2002-29, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).

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