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Inefficiency of equilibria in query auctions with continuous valuations

Author

Listed:
  • Grigorieva, E.

    (Quantitative Economics)

  • Herings, P.J.J.

    (Microeconomics & Public Economics)

  • Müller, R.J.

    (Quantitative Economics)

  • Vermeulen, A.J.

    (Quantitative Economics)

Abstract
No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Grigorieva, E. & Herings, P.J.J. & Müller, R.J. & Vermeulen, A.J., 2006. "Inefficiency of equilibria in query auctions with continuous valuations," Research Memorandum 017, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    • Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2006017
    DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2006017
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1977. "Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(2), pages 427-438, March.
    2. Krishna, Vijay, 2009. "Auction Theory," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 2, number 9780123745071.
    3. Elena Grigorieva & P. Herings & Rudolf Müller & Dries Vermeulen, 2007. "The private value single item bisection auction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 30(1), pages 107-118, January.
    4. Rothkopf, Michael H. & Harstad, Ronald M., 1994. "On the role of discrete bid levels in oral auctions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 572-581, May.
    5. Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1977. "On the revelation of preferences for public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 79-93, August.
    6. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    7. Muysken, J. & Rutten, T., 2002. "Disability in the Netherlands: another dutch disease?," Research Memorandum 051, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
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    Cited by:

    1. Grigorieva, Elena & Jean-Jacques Herings, P. & Müller, Rudolf & Vermeulen, Dries, 2012. "Fraction auctions: The tradeoff between efficiency and running time," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 220(2), pages 577-587.

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