A Popperian test of level-k theory
Author
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Vincent P. Crawford & Uri Gneezy & Yuval Rottenstreich, 2008. "The Power of Focal Points Is Limited: Even Minute Payoff Asymmetry May Yield Large Coordination Failures," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1443-1458, September.
- Nicholas Bardsley & Judith Mehta & Chris Starmer & Robert Sugden, 2010.
"Explaining Focal Points: Cognitive Hierarchy Theory "versus" Team Reasoning,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 120(543), pages 40-79, March.
- Nicholas Bardsley & Judith Mehta & Chris Starmer & Robert Sugden, 2008. "Explaining Focal Points: Cognitive Hierarchy Theory versus Team Reasoning," Discussion Papers 2008-17, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1999.
"Experience from a Course in Game Theory: Pre- and Postclass Problem Sets as a Didactic Device,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 155-170, July.
- A. Rubinstein, 1999. "Experience from a Course in Game Theory: Pre- and Post-class Problem Sets as a Didactic Device," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s4, Economics Department, Princeton University.
- Rubinstein, A., 1999. "Experience from a Course in Game Theory: Pre and Post-Class Problem Sets as a Didactic Device," Papers 7-99, Tel Aviv.
- Nagel, Rosemarie, 1995. "Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1313-1326, December.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Cyril Hédoin & Lauren Larrouy, 2016. "Game Theory, Institutions and the Schelling-Bacharach Principle: Toward an Empirical Social Ontology," GREDEG Working Papers 2016-21, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Vincent P. Crawford & Miguel A. Costa-Gomes & Nagore Iriberri, 2010. "Strategic Thinking," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000001148, David K. Levine.
- Elten, Jonas van & Penczynski, Stefan P., 2020. "Coordination games with asymmetric payoffs: An experimental study with intra-group communication," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 158-188.
- Irenaeus Wolff, 2017.
"Lucky Numbers in Simple Games,"
TWI Research Paper Series
107, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
- Irenaeus Wolff, 2019. "Lucky Numbers in Simple Games," TWI Research Paper Series 115, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
- Vincent P. Crawford & Miguel A. Costa-Gomes & Nagore Iriberri, 2013. "Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 51(1), pages 5-62, March.
- Bosch-Domènech, Antoni & Vriend, Nicolaas J., 2013.
"On the role of non-equilibrium focal points as coordination devices,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 52-67.
- Antoni Bosch-Domènech & Nicolaas J. Vriend, 2008. "On the role of non-equilibrium focal points as coordination devices," Economics Working Papers 1064, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Antoni Bosch-Domènech & Nicolaas J. Vriend, 2008. "On the Role of Non-equilibrium Focal Points as Coordination Devices," Working Papers 621, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- Dai, Zhixin & Zheng, Jiwei & Zizzo, Daniel John, 2024.
"Theories of reasoning and focal point play with a matched non-student sample,"
China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
- ZHIXIN Dai & Jiwei Zheng & Daniel J. Zizzo, 2020. "Theories of reasoning and focal point play with a matched non-student sample," Working Papers 305138067, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
- Guilhem Lecouteux, 2018.
"What does “we” want? Team Reasoning, Game Theory, and Unselfish Behaviours,"
Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 128(3), pages 311-332.
- Guilhem Lecouteux, 2018. "What Does 'We' Want? Team Reasoning, Game Theory, and Unselfish Behaviours," GREDEG Working Papers 2018-17, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
- Guilhem Lecouteux, 2018. "What Does 'We' Want? Team Reasoning, Game Theory, and Unselfish Behaviours," Working Papers halshs-01837218, HAL.
- Guilhem Lecouteux, 2018. "What does “we” want? Team Reasoning, Game Theory, and Unselfish Behaviours," Post-Print halshs-01858190, HAL.
- Bizer, Kilian & Meub, Lukas & Proeger, Till & Spiwoks, Markus, 2014. "Strategic coordination in forecasting: An experimental study," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 195, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
- Alessandro Sontuoso & Sudeep Bhatia, 2021.
"A notion of prominence for games with natural‐language labels,"
Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), pages 283-312, January.
- Alessandro Sontuoso & Sudeep Bhatia, 2017. "A Notion of Prominence for Games with Natural-Language Labels," PPE Working Papers 0009, Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised Nov 2018.
- Alessandro Sontuoso & Sudeep Bhatia, 2020. "A Notion of Prominence for Games with Natural-Language Labels," Working Papers 20-38, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Marco Faillo & Alessandra Smerilli & Robert Sugden, 2016. "Can a single theory explain coordination? An experiment on alternative modes of reasoning and the conditions under which they are used," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 16-01, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Subhasish M Chowdhury & Dan Kovenock & David Rojo Arjona & Nathaniel T Wilcox, 2021.
"Focality and Asymmetry in Multi-Battle Contests,"
The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(636), pages 1593-1619.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Dan Kovenock & David Rojo Arjona & Nathaniel T. Wilcox, 2016. "Focality and asymmetry in multi-battle contests," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 16-12, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Dan Kovenock & David Rojo Arjona & Nathaniel T. Wilcox, 2016. "Focality and Asymmetry in Multi-battle Contests," Working Papers 16-16, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Bardsley, Nicholas & Ule, Aljaž, 2017.
"Focal points revisited: Team reasoning, the principle of insufficient reason and cognitive hierarchy theory,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 74-86.
- Bardsley, Nicholas & Ule, Aljaz, 2014. "Focal Points Revisited: Team Reasoning, the Principle of Insufficient Reason and Cognitive Hierarchy Theory," MPRA Paper 58256, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- repec:uea:wcbess:13-02 is not listed on IDEAS
- Zhixin Dai & Jiwei Zheng & Daniel John Zizzo, 2019.
"Theories Of Reasoning and Focal Point Play With A Non-Student Sample,"
Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS)
19-05, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Zhixin Dai & Jiwei Zheng & Daniel John Zizzo, 2019. "Theories of reasoning and focal point play with a non-student sample," Discussion Papers Series 612, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
- Isoni, Andrea & Poulsen, Anders & Sugden, Robert & Tsutsui, Kei, 2013. "Focal points in tacit bargaining problems: Experimental evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 167-188.
- Parravano, Melanie & Poulsen, Odile, 2015.
"Stake size and the power of focal points in coordination games: Experimental evidence,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 191-199.
- Melanie Parravano & Odile Poulsen, 2014. "Stake size and the power of focal points in coordination games: Experimental evidence," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 14-07, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Isoni, Andrea & Poulsen, Anders & Sugden, Robert & Tsutsui, Kei, 2019. "Focal points and payoff information in tacit bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 193-214.
- Zoe Bett & Anders Poulsen & Odile Poulsen, 2013. "How Salient is an Equal but Inefficient Outcome in a Coordination Situation? Some Experimental Evidence," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 13-02-R, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Marco Faillo & Alessandra Smerilli & Robert Sugden, 2013. "The roles of level-k and team reasoning in solving coordination games," CEEL Working Papers 1306, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
- Bett, Zoë & Poulsen, Anders & Poulsen, Odile, 2016. "The focality of dominated compromises in tacit coordination situations: Experimental evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 29-34.
- Faillo, Marco & Smerilli, Alessandra & Sugden, Robert, 2017. "Bounded best-response and collective-optimality reasoning in coordination games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 317-335.
More about this item
Keywords
level-k theory; Popper; Hide and Seek; coordination; discoordination;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:uea:wcbess:12-06. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Cara Liggins (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/esueauk.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.