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Standards, Innovation Incentives, and the Formation of Patent Pools

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  • Schmidt, Klaus M.
Abstract
Technological standards give rise to a complements problem that affects pricing and innovation incentives of technology producers. In this paper I discuss how patent pools can be used to solve these problems and what incentives patent holders have to form a patent pool. I offer some suggestions how competition authorities can foster the formation of welfare increasing patent pools.

Suggested Citation

  • Schmidt, Klaus M., 2010. "Standards, Innovation Incentives, and the Formation of Patent Pools," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 342, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  • Handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:342
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    File URL: https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13212/1/342.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Josh Lerner & Marcin Strojwas & Jean Tirole, 2007. "The design of patent pools: the determinants of licensing rules," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(3), pages 610-625, September.
    2. Aoki, Reiko & Nagaoka, Sadao, 2004. "The Consortium Standard and Patent Pools," Economic Review, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 55(4), pages 345-357, October.
    3. Dequiedt, V. & Versaevel, B., 2004. "Patent pools and the dynamic incentives to R&D," Working Papers 200412, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
    4. Dequiedt, Vianney & Versaevel, Bruno, 2013. "Patent pools and dynamic R&D incentives," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 59-69.
    5. Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2004. "Efficient Patent Pools," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 691-711, June.
    6. Carl Shapiro, 2001. "Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting," NBER Chapters, in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 1, pages 119-150, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Gilbert, Richard J. & Katz, Michael L., 2011. "Efficient division of profits from complementary innovations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 443-454, July.
    8. Klaus M. Schmidt, 2014. "Complementary Patents and Market Structure," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(1), pages 68-88, March.
    9. Aoki, Reiko & 青木, 玲子 & Nagaoka, Sadao & 長岡, 貞男, 2005. "Coalition Formation for a Consortium Standard Through a Standard Body and a Patent Pool: Theory and Evidence from MPEG2, DVD and 3G," IIR Working Paper 05-01, Institute of Innovation Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    10. Sung-Hwan Kim, 2004. "Vertical Structure and Patent Pools," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 25(3), pages 231-250, July.
    11. Anne Layne‐Farrar & Gerard Llobet & Jorge Padilla, 2014. "Payments and Participation: The Incentives to Join Cooperative Standard Setting Efforts," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(1), pages 24-49, March.
    12. Lemley, Mark A & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "Patent Hold-Up and Royalty Stacking," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt8638s257, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Dequiedt, Vianney & Versaevel, Bruno, 2013. "Patent pools and dynamic R&D incentives," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 59-69.
    2. Chryssoula Pentheroudakis, 2015. "Innovation in the European Digital Single Market: The Role of Patents," JRC Research Reports JRC96728, Joint Research Centre.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Patent pools; standard setting organisations; innovation; complements problem; patent thicket;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
    • O3 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights

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