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Providing efficient network access to green power generators:: A long-term property rights perspective

Author

Listed:
  • Petropoulos, Georgios
  • Willems, Bert
Abstract
Coordinating the timing of new production facilities is one of the challenges of liberalized power sectors. It is complicated by the presence of transmission bottlenecks, oligopolistic competition and the unknown prospects of low-carbon technologies. We build a model encompassing a late and early investment stage, an existing dirty (brown) and a future clean (green) technology and a single transmission bottleneck, and compare dynamic efficiency of several market designs. Allocating network access on a short-term competitive basis distorts investment decisions, as brown firms will preempt green competitors by investing early. Dynamic efficiency is restored with long-term transmission rights that can be traded on a secondary market. We show that dynamic efficiency does not require the existence of physical rights for accessing the transmission line, but financial rights on receiving the scarcity revenues generated by the transmission line suffice.

Suggested Citation

  • Petropoulos, Georgios & Willems, Bert, 2017. "Providing efficient network access to green power generators:: A long-term property rights perspective," TSE Working Papers 17-770, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:31526
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    network access; congestion management; renewable energy sources; power markets;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities

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