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Data and Competition: a General Framework with Applications to Mergers, Market Structure, and Privacy Policy

Author

Listed:
  • de Cornière, Alexandre
  • Taylor, Greg
Abstract
What role does data play in competition? This question has been at the center of a fierce debate around competition policy in the digital economy. We use a competition-in-utilities approach to provide a general framework for studying the competitive effects of data, encompassing a wide range of markets where data has many different uses. We identify conditions for data to be unilaterally proor anti-competitive (UPC or UAC). The conditions are simple and often require no information about market demand. We apply our framework to study various applications of data, including training algorithms, targeting advertisements, and personalizing prices. We also show that whether data is UPC or UAC has important implications for policy issues such as data-driven mergers, market structure, and privacy policy.

Suggested Citation

  • de Cornière, Alexandre & Taylor, Greg, 2020. "Data and Competition: a General Framework with Applications to Mergers, Market Structure, and Privacy Policy," TSE Working Papers 20-1076, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:124102
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy

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