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The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty? Evidence from British Commutations During World War I

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  • Chen, Daniel L.
Abstract
During World War I, the British military condemned over 3,000 soldiers to death, but only executed 12% of them; the others received commuted sentences. Many historians believe that the military command confirmed or commuted sentences for reasons unrelated to the circumstances of a particular case and that the application of the death penalty was essentially a random, “pitiless lottery.” Using a dataset on all capital cases during World War I, I statistically investigate this claim and find that the data are consistent with an essentially random process. Using this result, I exploit variation in commutations and executions within military units to identify the deterrent effect of executions, with deterrence measured by the elapsed time within a unit between the resolution of a death sentence (i.e., a commutation or execution) and subsequent absences within that unit. Absences are measured via handwritten trial records and “wanted” lists prepared by British military police units searching for deserters and preserved in war diaries and police gazettes. I find some limited evidence that executing deserters deterred absences, while executing Irish soldiers, regardless of the crime, spurred absences, particularly Irish absences. I present a model where perceived legitimacy of authority affects why people obey the law.

Suggested Citation

  • Chen, Daniel L., 2016. "The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty? Evidence from British Commutations During World War I," IAST Working Papers 16-50, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).
    • Handle: RePEc:tse:iastwp:31021
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Voth, Hans-Joachim & Xu, Guo, 2020. "Encouraging Others: Punishment and Performance in the Royal Navy," CEPR Discussion Papers 14476, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Francesc Dilmé & Daniel F Garrett, 2019. "Residual Deterrence," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 17(5), pages 1654-1686.
    3. Christoph Dworschak, 2020. "Jumping on the Bandwagon: Differentiation and Security Defection during Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 64(7-8), pages 1335-1357, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Compliance; Legitimacy; Deterrence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • N44 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: 1913-
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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