Non-Consequential Moral Preferences, Detail-Free Implementation, and Representative Systems
Author
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Neeman, Zvika, 2004.
"The relevance of private information in mechanism design,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 55-77, July.
- Zvika Neeman, 1998. "The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design," Papers 0093, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Neeman, Z., 1998. "The Relevance of Private Infromation in Mechanism Design," Papers 93, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Matsushima Hitoshi, 1993. "Bayesian Monotonicity with Side Payments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 107-121, February.
- Deneckere,R. & Severinov,S., 2001. "Mechanism design and communication costs," Working papers 23, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, "undated".
"Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications,"
IEW - Working Papers
075, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Ernst Fehr & Klaus Schmidt, 2000. "Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity – Evidence and Economic Applications," CESifo Working Paper Series 403, CESifo.
- Schmidt, Klaus & Fehr, Ernst, 2001. "Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications," CEPR Discussion Papers 2703, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1988. "A new approach to the implementation problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 128-144, June.
- Dewatripont,Mathias & Hansen,Lars Peter & Turnovsky,Stephen J. (ed.), 2003. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521818728, September.
- Glazer, Jacob & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1998. "Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 157-173, April.
- Eric Maskin, 1999.
"Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
- Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Kfir Eliaz, 2002. "Fault Tolerant Implementation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 69(3), pages 589-610.
- Dewatripont,Mathias & Hansen,Lars Peter & Turnovsky,Stephen J. (ed.), 2003. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521524131, September.
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2000. "Type Diversity and Virtual Bayesian Implementation Creation-Date: 2000," Working Papers 2000-16, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Alger, Ingela & Albert Ma, Ching-to, 2003.
"Moral hazard, insurance, and some collusion,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 225-247, February.
- Ingela Brundin & Ching-to Albert Ma, 1998. "Moral Hazard, Insurance, and Some Collusion," Papers 0089, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Alger, Ingela & Ma, Ching-to, 1999. "Moral hazard, insurance, and some collusion," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119128, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Ching-to Albert Ma & Ingela Alger, 1999. "Moral Hazard, Insurance and Some Collusion," FMG Discussion Papers dp318, Financial Markets Group.
- Ingela Alger & Ching-to Albert Ma, 2001. "Moral Hazard, Insurance, and Some Collusion," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 496, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Dewatripont,Mathias & Hansen,Lars Peter & Turnovsky,Stephen J. (ed.), 2003. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521818742, September.
- Brian Erard & Jonathan S. Feinstein, 1994.
"Honesty and Evasion in the Tax Compliance Game,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 1-19, Spring.
- Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1993. "Honesty and Evasion in the Tax Compliance Game," Carleton Economic Papers 93-06, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised 1994.
- Jean Tirole, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 741-782, July.
- Dewatripont,Mathias & Hansen,Lars Peter & Turnovsky,Stephen J. (ed.), 2003. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521524117, September.
- Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994.
"A Course in Game Theory,"
MIT Press Books,
The MIT Press,
edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, April.
- Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009. "A Course in Game Theory," Levine's Bibliography 814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Dewatripont,Mathias & Hansen,Lars Peter & Turnovsky,Stephen J. (ed.), 2003. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521818735, September.
- Dewatripont,Mathias & Hansen,Lars Peter & Turnovsky,Stephen J. (ed.), 2003. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521524124, September.
- K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), 2002. "Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005. "Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance ( Published in "Journal of Economic Theory" (as a regular article). )," CARF F-Series CARF-F-050, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2007.
"Mechanism design with side payments: Individual rationality and iterative dominance,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 1-30, March.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-185, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005. "Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-376, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004. "Non-Consequential Moral Preferences, Detail-Free Implementation, and Representative Systems ( Revised as CARF-F-062(2006) )," CARF F-Series CARF-F-015, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2003. "Universal Mechanisms and Moral Preferences in Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-254, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2003. "Implementation and Preference for Honesty," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-244, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2007.
"Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(520), pages 637-653, April.
- Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004. "Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points," CEPR Discussion Papers 4264, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Reserve prices in auctions as reference points," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 24/2005, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- S. Rosenkranz & P. Schmitz, 2005. "Reserve prices in auctions as reference points," Working Papers 05-14, Utrecht School of Economics.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Honesty-Proof Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-178, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Martin Beckenkamp & Heike Hennig-Schmidt & Frank P. Maier-Rigaud, 2007. "Cooperation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma Games," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_25, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2011.
"Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 186-199, September.
- Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2009. "Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 7205, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet & Carsten Helm, 2006.
"Output and wages with inequality averse agents,"
Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 39(2), pages 399-413, May.
- Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet & Carsten Helm, 2006. "Output and wages with inequality averse agents," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 39(2), pages 399-413, May.
- Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet & Carsten Helm, 2004. "Output and Wages with Inequality Averse Agents," Cahiers de recherche 0419, CIRPEE.
- Demougin, Dominique & Fluet, Claude & Helm, Carsten, 2006. "Output and wages with inequality averse agents," Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute for Business Studies (BWL) 33628, Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute for Business Studies (BWL).
- Dominique Demougin & Claude Denys Fluet & Carsten Helm, 2004. "Output and Wages with Inequality Averse Agents," CIRANO Working Papers 2004s-47, CIRANO.
- Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2009. "Gathering Information before Signing a Contract: Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 7252, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Stephan Meier & Alois Stutzer, 2008.
"Is Volunteering Rewarding in Itself?,"
Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 75(297), pages 39-59, February.
- Stephan Meier & Alois Stutzer, "undated". "Is Volunteering Rewarding in Itself?," IEW - Working Papers 180, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Meier, Stephan & Stutzer, Alois, 2004. "Is Volunteering Rewarding in Itself?," IZA Discussion Papers 1045, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Casal, Sandro & Fallucchi, Francesco & Quercia, Simone, 2019.
"The role of morals in three-player ultimatum games,"
Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 67-79.
- Sandro Casal & Francesco Fallucchi & Simone Quercia, 2017. "The role of morals in three-player ultimatum games," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 16-05R, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- CASAL Sandro & FALLUCCHI Francesco & QUERCIA Simone, 2018. "The Role of Morals in Three-Player Ultimatum Games," LISER Working Paper Series 2018-15, Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER).
- Germán Reyes & Leonardo Gasparini, 2017.
"Perceptions of Distributive Justice in Latin America During a Period of Falling Inequality,"
CEDLAS, Working Papers
0209, CEDLAS, Universidad Nacional de La Plata.
- Reyes,German Jeremias & Gasparini,Leonardo Carlos, 2017. "Perceptions of distributive justice in Latin America during a period of falling inequality," Policy Research Working Paper Series 8072, The World Bank.
- Simon Gaechter, 2006.
"Conditional cooperation: Behavioral regularities from the lab and the field and their policy implications,"
Discussion Papers
2006-03, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Simon Gaechter, 2006. "Conditional cooperation: Behavioral regularities from the lab and the field and their policy implications," Discussion Papers 2006-03, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Andreas Roider & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2012.
"Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 114(3), pages 808-830, September.
- Schmitz, Patrick W. & Roider, Andreas, 2007. "Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices," CEPR Discussion Papers 6476, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Brunnermeier, Markus & Abadi, Joseph, 2018.
"Blockchain Economics,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
13420, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Joseph Abadi & Markus Brunnermeier, 2018. "Blockchain Economics," NBER Working Papers 25407, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Joseph Abadi & Markus K. Brunnermeier, 2022. "Blockchain Economics," Working Papers 22-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Joseph Abadi & Markus Brunnermeier, 2019. "Blockchain Economics," Working Papers 2019-12, Princeton University. Economics Department..
- Simon Cornée & Marc Jegers & Ariane Szafarz, 2018.
"A Theory of Social Finance,"
Working Papers
halshs-01717167, HAL.
- Simon Cornée & Marc Jegers & Ariane Szafarz, 2018. "A Theory of Social Finance," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 2018-02, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
- Simon Cornée & Marc Jegers & Ariane Szafarz, 2018. "A Theory of Social Finance," Working Papers CEB 18-010, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Eva I. Hoppe & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2013.
"Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 80(4), pages 1516-1544.
- Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study," MPRA Paper 44240, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2013. "Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study," CEPR Discussion Papers 9287, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Pedro FrancŽs-G—mez & Lorenzo Sacconi & Marco Faillo, 2012. "Behavioral Business Ethics as a Method for Normative Business Ethics," Econometica Working Papers wp42, Econometica.
- Simon Cornée & Ariane Szafarz, 2014.
"Vive la Différence: Social Banks and Reciprocity in the Credit Market,"
Post-Print CEB, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, vol. 125(3), pages 361-380.
- Simon Cornée & Ariane Szafarz, 2014. "Vive la Différence: Social Banks and Reciprocity in the Credit Market," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 125(3), pages 361-380, December.
- Simon Cornée & Ariane Szafarz, 2012. "Vive la Différence: Social Banks and Reciprocity in the Credit Market," Working Papers CEB 12-029, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Simon Cornée & Ariane Szafarz, 2014. "Vive la Différence: Social Banks and Reciprocity in the Credit Market," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/192366, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Simon Cornée & Ariane Szafarz, 2014. "Vive la Différence: Social Banks and Reciprocity in the Credit Market," Post-Print hal-02944436, HAL.
- Simon Cornée & Ariane Szafarz, 2013. "Vive la Différence: Social Banks and Reciprocity in the Credit Market," Post-Print halshs-00874615, HAL.
- Clark, Andrew E. & Loheac, Youenn, 2007.
""It wasn't me, it was them!" Social influence in risky behavior by adolescents,"
Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 763-784, July.
- Clark, Andrew E & Youenn Loheac, 2003. ""It Wasn't Me, It Was Them!" Social Influence in Risky Behaviour by Adolescents," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 44, Royal Economic Society.
- Clark, Andrew E. & Lohéac, Youenn, 2005. ""It Wasn't Me, It Was Them!" - Social Influence in Risky Behavior by Adolescents," IZA Discussion Papers 1573, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tky:fseres:2004cf304. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CIRJE administrative office (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ritokjp.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.