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Efficient Status Seeking: Externalities, and the Evolution of Status Games

In: 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2

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  • Roger D. Congleton

    (George Mason University)

Abstract
Status-seeking games are games in which an individual’s utility is determined by his relative expenditure on status-seeking activities rather than his absolute consumption. There are a number of parallels between status-seeking and rent-seeking activities, for example, a tendency for Pareto excessive private investment. However, many status-seeking activities differ from rent- seeking activities insofar as they generate significant benefits to individuals not actively involved in the game. Given an array of more or less productive status-seeking games, it is likely that relatively efficient status conferring mechanisms will tend to displace less efficient ones.

Suggested Citation

  • Roger D. Congleton, 1989. "Efficient Status Seeking: Externalities, and the Evolution of Status Games," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 697-712, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-79247-5_42
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_42
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