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Hidden Advertising and Firm size: the Symmetry Effect

Author

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  • Andrea Mangani
  • Andrea Antonelli
Abstract
Economists and marketing scholars have devoted considerable attention to studying the underlying factors, diverse forms, and potential consequences of embedded advertising, which involves blending marketing communications with media content in a way that appears non-promotional. In most countries, the disclosure of embedded advertising to consumers is required by law. However, instances of inadequate disclosure are frequent. Our study examines the factors that influence hidden advertising, which refers to embedded advertising without proper disclosure, by analysing the characteristics of cases handled by the Italian Competition Authority between 1993 and 2022. Among the factors considered, firm size emerges as the sole consistent determinant affecting the likelihood of non-compliance. When the media outlet and the advertiser possess similar sizes, the probability of infringement tends to be higher. Â JEL classification numbers: D18, L51, L82, M37.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrea Mangani & Andrea Antonelli, 2024. "Hidden Advertising and Firm size: the Symmetry Effect," Advances in Management and Applied Economics, SCIENPRESS Ltd, vol. 14(2), pages 1-6.
    • Handle: RePEc:spt:admaec:v:14:y:2024:i:2:f:14_2_6
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Soontae An & Hannah Kang & Sra Koo, 2019. "Sponsorship Disclosures of Native Advertising: Clarity and Prominence," Journal of Consumer Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 998-1024, September.
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    3. Martin Abraham & Kerstin Lorek & Friedemann Richter & Matthias Wrede, 2017. "Collusive tax evasion and social norms," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(2), pages 179-197, April.
    4. Bjørneby, Marie & Alstadsæter, Annette & Telle, Kjetil, 2021. "Limits to third-party reporting: Evidence from a randomized field experiment in Norway," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Embedded advertising; Hidden advertising; Mass Media; Media regulation; Consumer protection; Empirical analysis.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D18 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Protection
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media
    • M37 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Advertising

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