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original papers : Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation

Author

Listed:
  • Pierre Favardin

    (G.E.M.M.A.-C.R.E.M.E., University of Caen, 14032 Caen Cedex, France)

  • Dominique Lepelley

    (G.E.M.M.A.-C.R.E.M.E., University of Caen, 14032 Caen Cedex, France)

  • Jérôme Serais

    (G.E.M.M.A.-C.R.E.M.E., University of Caen, 14032 Caen Cedex, France)

Abstract
The voting situations at which the Borda rule or the Copeland method can be manipulated by a single voter or a coalition of voters in three-alternative elections are characterized. From these characterizations, we derive (when possible) some analytical representations measuring the vulnerability of these rules to strategic misrepresentation of preferences. Our results suggest that the Borda rule is significantly more vulnerable to strategic manipulation than the Copeland method.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley & Jérôme Serais, 2002. "original papers : Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 7(2), pages 213-228.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:7:y:2002:i:2:p:213-228
    Note: Received: 6 April 2001 / Accepted: 14 December 2001
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Green-Armytage, James, 2011. "Strategic voting and nomination," MPRA Paper 32200, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Slinko, Arkadii, 2004. "How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 289-293, May.
    3. Diss, Mostapha & Tsvelikhovskiy, Boris, 2021. "Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 11-18.
    4. Haris Aziz & Alexander Lam, 2021. "Obvious Manipulability of Voting Rules," Papers 2111.01983, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2022.
    5. Barak, Sasan & Dahooei, Jalil Heidary, 2018. "A novel hybrid fuzzy DEA-Fuzzy MADM method for airlines safety evaluation," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 134-149.
    6. Dominique Lepelley & Ahmed Louichi & Hatem Smaoui, 2008. "On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(3), pages 363-383, April.
    7. Krzysztof Kontek & Honorata Sosnowska, 2020. "Specific Tastes or Cliques of Jurors? How to Reduce the Level of Manipulation in Group Decisions?," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(6), pages 1057-1084, December.
    8. Mostapha Diss, 2015. "Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 229(1), pages 347-376, June.
    9. Moyouwou, Issofa & Tchantcho, Hugue, 2017. "Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 70-82.
    10. Varmazyar, Mohsen & Dehghanbaghi, Maryam & Afkhami, Mehdi, 2016. "A novel hybrid MCDM model for performance evaluation of research and technology organizations based on BSC approach," Evaluation and Program Planning, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 125-140.
    11. Bednay, Dezső & Moskalenko, Anna & Tasnádi, Attila, 2019. "Dictatorship versus manipulability," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 72-76.
    12. James Green-Armytage & T. Tideman & Rafael Cosman, 2016. "Statistical evaluation of voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 183-212, January.
    13. Yeawon Yoo & Adolfo R. Escobedo, 2021. "A New Binary Programming Formulation and Social Choice Property for Kemeny Rank Aggregation," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 18(4), pages 296-320, December.
    14. William V. Gehrlein & Hemant V. Kher, 2004. "Decision Rules for the Academy Awards Versus Those for Elections," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 34(3), pages 226-234, June.
    15. Fujun Hou, 2024. "A new social welfare function with a number of desirable properties," Papers 2403.16373, arXiv.org.
    16. Rahimdel, Mohammad Javad & Noferesti, Hossein, 2020. "Investment preferences of Iran's mineral extraction sector with a focus on the productivity of the energy consumption, water and labor force," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    17. P. Battiston & M. Magnani & D. Paolini & L. Rossi, 2024. "Country vs. Music: Strategic Incentives for Competing Voters," Economics Department Working Papers 2024-EP02, Department of Economics, Parma University (Italy).
    18. Alireza Shahrasbi & Mehdi Shamizanjani & M. H. Alavidoost & Babak Akhgar, 2017. "An Aggregated Fuzzy Model for the Selection of a Managed Security Service Provider," International Journal of Information Technology & Decision Making (IJITDM), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 16(03), pages 625-684, May.
    19. Jalil Heidary Dahooie & Ali Husseinzadeh Kashan & Zahra Shoaei Naeini & Amir Salar Vanaki & Edmundas Kazimieras Zavadskas & Zenonas Turskis, 2022. "A Hybrid Multi-Criteria-Decision-Making Aggregation Method and Geographic Information System for Selecting Optimal Solar Power Plants in Iran," Energies, MDPI, vol. 15(8), pages 1-20, April.
    20. Zeyi Chen, 2022. "Utilitarian Welfare Optimization in the Generalized Vertex Coloring Games: An Implication to Venue Selection in Events Planning," Papers 2206.09153, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2023.
    21. Marie-Louise Lackner & Martin Lackner, 2017. "On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(4), pages 717-745, April.
    22. Cervone, Davide P. & Dai, Ronghua & Gnoutcheff, Daniel & Lanterman, Grant & Mackenzie, Andrew & Morse, Ari & Srivastava, Nikhil & Zwicker, William S., 2012. "Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 11-27.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Voting theory; manipulability; positional voting systems;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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