0 there exists a probability distribution p over the space of pure strategy profiles that satisfies the following. With probability at least 1-, if a pure strategy profile is chosen according to p and each player is informed of his pure strategy, no player can profit more than in any sufficiently long game by deviating from the recommended strategy."> 0 there exists a probability distribution p over the space of pure strategy profiles that satisfies the following. With probability at least 1-, if a pure strategy profile is chosen according to p and each player is informed of his pure strategy, no player can profit more than in any sufficiently long game by deviating from the recommended strategy.">
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Correlated equilibrium payoffs and public signalling in absorbing games

Author

Listed:
  • Eilon Solan

    (Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, and School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel)

  • Rakesh V. Vohra

    (Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston IL 60208)

Abstract
An absorbing game is a repeated game where some action combinations are absorbing, in the sense that whenever they are played, there is a positive probability that the game terminates, and the players receive some terminal payoff at every future stage. We prove that every multi-player absorbing game admits a correlated equilibrium payoff. In other words, for every >0 there exists a probability distribution p over the space of pure strategy profiles that satisfies the following. With probability at least 1-, if a pure strategy profile is chosen according to p and each player is informed of his pure strategy, no player can profit more than in any sufficiently long game by deviating from the recommended strategy.

Suggested Citation

  • Eilon Solan & Rakesh V. Vohra, 2002. "Correlated equilibrium payoffs and public signalling in absorbing games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 31(1), pages 91-121.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:31:y:2002:i:1:p:91-121
    Note: Received: April 2001/Revised: June 4, 2002
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Abraham Neyman, 2013. "Stochastic Games with Short-Stage Duration," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 236-278, June.
    2. Tim Roughgarden, 2018. "Complexity Theory, Game Theory, and Economics: The Barbados Lectures," Papers 1801.00734, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2020.
    3. Neyman, Abraham, 2017. "Continuous-time stochastic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 92-130.
    4. Eilon Solan & Omri N. Solan, 2021. "Sunspot equilibrium in positive recursive general quitting games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(4), pages 891-909, December.
    5. Yuval Heller, 2012. "Sequential Correlated Equilibria in Stopping Games," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 60(1), pages 209-224, February.
    6. Eilon Solan, 2002. "Subgame-Perfection in Quitting Games with Perfect Information and Differential Equations," Discussion Papers 1356, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    7. Eilon Solan, 2018. "The modified stochastic game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(4), pages 1287-1327, November.
    8. Flesch, J. & Schoenmakers, G.M. & Vrieze, K., 2008. "Stochastic games on a product state space: the periodic case," Research Memorandum 016, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    9. János Flesch & Gijs Schoenmakers & Koos Vrieze, 2008. "Stochastic Games on a Product State Space," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 33(2), pages 403-420, May.
    10. Robert Samuel Simon, 2012. "A Topological Approach to Quitting Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 37(1), pages 180-195, February.
    11. Eilon Solan & Omri N. Solan, 2020. "Quitting Games and Linear Complementarity Problems," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 45(2), pages 434-454, May.
    12. Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2010. "Computing uniformly optimal strategies in two-player stochastic games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 42(1), pages 237-253, January.
    13. Eilon Solan, 2005. "Subgame-Perfection in Quitting Games with Perfect Information and Differential Equations," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 30(1), pages 51-72, February.
    14. János Flesch & Gijs Schoenmakers & Koos Vrieze, 2009. "Stochastic games on a product state space: the periodic case," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(2), pages 263-289, June.
    15. Alejandro Lee-Penagos, 2016. "Learning to Coordinate: Co-Evolution and Correlated Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 2016-11, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.

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