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Introduction to the Symposium

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  • George Deltas
Abstract
No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • George Deltas, 2009. "Introduction to the Symposium," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(1), pages 1-7, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:38:y:2009:i:1:p:1-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-008-0357-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jingfeng Lu, 2009. "Auction design with opportunity cost," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(1), pages 73-103, January.
    2. Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2009. "Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(1), pages 105-124, January.
    3. Stanley Reynolds & John Wooders, 2009. "Auctions with a buy price," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(1), pages 9-39, January.
    4. Samuelson, William F., 1985. "Competitive bidding with entry costs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 53-57.
    5. Leonardo Rezende, 2009. "Biased procurement auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(1), pages 169-185, January.
    6. McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions with entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 343-347.
    7. Subir Bose & George Deltas, 2007. "Exclusive Versus Non-exclusive Dealing in Auctions with Resale," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 31(1), pages 1-17, April.
    8. Jacques Crémer & Yossi Spiegel & Charles Zheng, 2009. "Auctions with costly information acquisition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(1), pages 41-72, January.
    9. Deltas, George & Jeitschko, Thomas D., 2007. "Auction hosting site pricing and market equilibrium with endogenous bidder and seller participation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 1190-1212, December.
    10. Subir Bose & Arup Daripa, 2009. "Optimal sale across venues and auctions with a buy-now option," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(1), pages 137-168, January.
    11. Robert Zeithammer, 2009. "Commitment in sequential auctioning: advance listings and threshold prices," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(1), pages 187-216, January.
    12. Simon Board, 2009. "Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(1), pages 125-135, January.
    13. Levin, Dan & Smith, James L, 1994. "Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 585-599, June.
    14. Subir Bose & George Deltas, 2002. "Exclusive Dealing through Resellers in Auctions with Stochastic Bidder Participation," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 69(1), pages 109-127, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bidding; Entry; D44;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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