The Dynamic Evolution of Preferences
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-006-0121-7
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- Aviad Heifetz & Chris Shannon & Yossi Spiegel, 2005. "The Dynamic Evolution of Preferences," Discussion Papers 1415, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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More about this item
Keywords
Evolution of preferences; Evolutionary stability; Overconfidence; Interdependent preferences; C72; D01;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
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