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Political Economy of Poverty in Turkey

Author

Listed:
  • Tarık ILIMAN
  • Recep TEKELİ
Abstract
While the fight against poverty is continuing in the world, secondary income distribution has regarded as an effective way in fighting against poverty in Turkey. For that purpose, the special fund called as “Social Aid and Solidarity Promotion Fund” established in 1986. Primarily this fund is a kind of social transfer expenditure and it aims at helping poor people directly. Although special funds as social direct expenditures utilized as the most effective instrument to combat poverty, allocation of the funds could be at the government’s discretion. Because of the unclear and subjective criteria in the fund allocation, it is possible that politicians to maximize their interests in the political arena can use the fund. Therefore, the government in Turkey might incline to manipulate the (social) public expenditures to maximize their interests and enhance the re-election chances in terms of political economy. This paper assesses empirically the relationship between “Social Aid and Solidarity Promotion Fund” (SASPF) and political economic factors within political-economy context. In this study, using 81 provincial level data, we find that funds, as social expenditures could be vital tools for politicians to maximize their political interests.

Suggested Citation

  • Tarık ILIMAN & Recep TEKELİ, 2016. "Political Economy of Poverty in Turkey," Sosyoekonomi Journal, Sosyoekonomi Society, issue 24(29).
  • Handle: RePEc:sos:sosjrn:160310
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Poverty; Political Economy; Pork-Barrel Politics; Special Funds.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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