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Boosting trust by facilitating communication: A model of trustee investments in information sharing

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  • Vincenz Frey
Abstract
Trust problems hamper many social and economic exchanges. In such situations, there are often institutions that enable trustors to share information on the performance of trustees. While the benefits of such institutions have been researched extensively, little is known about their emergence. This article presents a game-theoretic model for the understanding of investments by trustees in establishing information sharing between trustors. The model allows for a simultaneous analysis of investments in and effects of institutions for information sharing. It captures two mechanisms by which a trustee’s investment can promote trust. First, a trustee’s investment in establishing information sharing can enable network effects that facilitate trust and trustworthiness. Second, it can promote trust by serving as a signal of intrinsic trustworthiness. The analysis of the model implies predictions for how characteristics of the interaction situation affect whether these mechanisms motivate a trustee to establish information sharing.

Suggested Citation

  • Vincenz Frey, 2017. "Boosting trust by facilitating communication: A model of trustee investments in information sharing," Rationality and Society, , vol. 29(4), pages 471-503, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:29:y:2017:i:4:p:471-503
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463117734171
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    References listed on IDEAS

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